A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation by Adelman, David E.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 32 New Directions in Environmental Law 
January 2010 
A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation 
David E. Adelman 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David E. Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 377 (2010), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/12 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
377 
A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in 
Toxics Regulation 
David E. Adelman  
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the most dramatic and politically salient environmental 
disasters have involved toxic substances of one form or another. One 
need only think of Love Canal in New York, the Exxon Valdez in 
Alaska, Bhopal in India, Chernobyl in Ukraine, or the burning 
Cuyahoga River in Ohio.
1
 Yet despite the iconic status of these 
events, regulation of toxic substances in the United States (and 
elsewhere) is criticized by a broad cross-section of stakeholders and 
experts. Among those on the left, the primary statute, the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (―TSCA‖), is considered moribund and 
structurally unsound because of the high barriers it creates to 
regulatory action.
2
 Critics on the right challenge the scientific bases 
for regulation and question, often on the basis of cost-benefit 
analyses, the rationality of the regulations that exist.
3
 No one is 
particularly happy with the status quo.
4
 
 
  Harry Reasoner Regents Chair in Law at the University of Texas at Austin School of 
Law. 
 1. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and 
Back Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 66–67 (2005). 
 2. See John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for 
Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 723, 734–36 (2008) [hereinafter 
Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH]. 
 3. See David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for 
Environmental Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 168–69 (2005). See generally RISKS, 
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn 
ed., 1996) (citing evidence revealing the lack of success of recent government risk reduction 
expenditures); John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against 
Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13 (1997) (arguing that more effective, less costly 
risk regulation could replace the current fragmentary regulations).  
 4. See, e.g., Dieter Pesendorfer, EU Environmental Policy under Pressure: Chemicals 
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The long winter, according to some commentators, may be 
ending.
5
 Other countries are establishing innovative chemical 
regulatory programs, most notably in the European Union (―EU‖) and 
Canada.
6
 Recent scientific advances promise a new paradigm of 
environmental toxicology that will erase the uncertainties, delays, and 
high costs that have plagued toxics regulation for decades.
7
 Efforts to 
reform toxics regulation are even beginning to make headway in the 
U.S., with promising legislation recently introduced in both the 
House and Senate.
8
 
The brightest light in the firmament is surely the Registration, 
Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (―REACH‖) program 
recently enacted in the EU.
9
 REACH, at least on the surface, corrects 
 
Policy Change between Antagonistic Goals?, 15 ENVTL. POL. 95, 111 (2006) (―The chemical 
policy reform under way is the result of serious anomalies of the current EU chemicals 
regulation concerning both environmental and health but also business and trade issues. These 
anomalies created a situation ‗in which all major coalitions view a continuation of the current 
situation as unacceptable.‘‖). 
 5. Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part I-Toxicogenomics, 33 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10071, 10071 (2003); Kenneth Olden et al., A Bold New Direction for 
Environmental Health Research, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1964, 1966 (2001) (―The new era of 
toxicogenomics, made possible by advances in human genomics, promises to revolutionize the 
practice of public health as it relates to environmental health protection.‖); N. Rothman et al., 
The Use of Common Genetic Polymorphisms to Enhance the Epidemiologic Study of 
Environmental Carcinogens, 1471 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA C1, C8 (2001) 
(―Epidemiologic studies that measure susceptibility genes should provide opportunities to 
detect . . . gene-environment interactions that may give rise to new clinical and public health 
strategies aimed at preventing and controlling cancer.‖); P. Trinia Simmons & Christopher J. 
Portier, Toxicogenomics: The New Frontier in Risk Analysis, 23 CARCINOGENESIS 903, 903–05 
(2002) (discussing how new technologies, including transgenic animals, molecular 
epidemiology, toxicogenomics, alternative models to animals, and mechanism-based 
mathematics, are helping develop more scientifically accurate risk assessments); Lewis L. 
Smith, Key Challenges for Toxicologists in the 21st Century, 22 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL 
SCI. 281, 282 (2001) (―The development of genomics, proteomics (the measurement of specific 
proteins) and metabonomics (the study of metabolite profiles of either intrinsic or xenobiotic 
molecules), combined with a greater knowledge of individual genetic polymorphisms, will offer 
new paradigms for hazard evaluation and risk assessment.‖).  
 6. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO 
IMPROVE EPA‘S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW 
PROGRAM, 29–31, app. II at 44–49 (2005) [hereinafter CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM]; 
Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 741–43.  
 7. See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 5, at 10071, 10082. 
 8. See, e.g., Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010). 
 9. David A. Wirth, The EU’s New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 91, 100 (2007) (describing REACH entering into force on June 1, 
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many of the perceived defects in TSCA. Most significantly, it shifts 
the burden of proof to chemical manufacturers to demonstrate the 
safety of their products and requires them to make detailed 
information available to the public on the potential hazards of the 
chemicals they make and sell.
10
  
Recent scientific advances are described in revolutionary terms.
11
 
This excitement is being propelled by expanding ―knowledge of 
genes associated with disease states to the study of toxicology of 
chemical and physical agents‖ referred to collectively as 
―toxicogenomics.‖12 Toxicogenomics is touted as providing a new 
generation of powerful screening methods for determining whether a 
chemical is toxic and whether individuals have been exposed to or 
harmed by a toxic substance.
13
 If this promise is realized, 
toxicogenomics will transform toxicology from its quasi-scientific 
status, subject to large uncertainties and inferential gaps, to a ―true‖ 
science based on detailed understanding of chemical toxicity and 
precise testing methods. 
As the title suggests, this Article adopts a guarded view of recent 
regulatory and scientific developments. While the regulatory 
advances in the EU will undoubtedly alter the landscape of toxics 
regulation in the United States and elsewhere, they incorporate many 
compromises that qualify their procedural and regulatory mandates. 
Antecedent laws, particularly the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
(―FDCA‖) in the United States, suggest that the effect of procedural 
measures, notably burden shifting, can be muted by agency discretion 
over implementation of a law. This may be especially true of 
REACH, which opens the door to evasion through its tiered chemical 
 
2007, after the final vote of the European Parliament and approval of the EU Environment 
Council). 
 10. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 744–47. 
 11. See William E. Bishop et al., The Genomic Revolution: What Does It Mean for Risk 
Assessment?, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 983, 983 (2001) (predicting that toxicogenomics ―will have 
profound impacts on the practice of risk assessment‖); Olden et al., supra note 5, at 1966 
(predicting that genomics methods ―will lead to a revolution in our approach to the study of 
toxicity‖). 
 12. Simmons & Portier, supra note 5, at 903.  
 13. Kenneth Olden & Janet Guthrie, Genomics: Implications for Toxicology, 473 
MUTATIONS RES. 3, 4 (2001) (―The technology and knowledge generated by genomics offer 
new and exciting possibilities for improving predictiveness, relevance and precision of 
toxicolog[y].‖). 
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classification scheme and the flexibility it affords manufacturers to 
use alternative testing methods.  
The past thirty years have demonstrated that toxics regulation is 
inextricably tied to scientific understanding. Science informs the 
architecture of regulatory regimes and supplies the factual grounding 
for agency decisions. I will show that the likelihood is low, if not 
negligible, that advances in toxicogenomics will significantly 
improve toxics regulation over the next decade or so. Even 
proponents of toxicogenomics acknowledge that validation and 
refinement of its methods could take ten to twenty years.
14
 Recent 
experience in the pharmaceutical industry suggests that this estimate 
may be overly optimistic. Despite aggressive use of genomics 
methods, drug development in the U.S. is in crisis—approvals of 
novel drugs hit a twenty-four year low in 2007
15
 despite a doubling of 
spending on research and development over the last decade.
16
 
Moreover, far from simplifying drug development processes, 
scientific understanding of human genetics is making them more 
complex
17
 and seemingly exacerbating the uncertainties that pervade 
drug development and toxicity testing.
18
  
The enthusiastic embrace of toxicogenomics is nevertheless 
understandable, as scientific uncertainties are the source of severe 
 
 14. Melvin E. Andersen & Daniel Krewksi, Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century: Bringing 
the Vision to Life, 107 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 324, 328 (2009); see also NAT‘L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 21st CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY 16 (2007) 
(―Implementing the [new toxicity testing strategy] will require improvements and focused effort 
over a period of decades.‖). 
 15. Avery Johnson & Ron Winslow, Drug Makers Say FDA Safety Focus Is Slowing 
New-Medicine Pipeline, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2008, at A1 (observing that in 2007 ―the FDA 
approved just 19 new medicines, the fewest in 24 years‖). 
 16. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: THE VISION 1 (2007), http://www. 
choruspharma.com/pharma2020final.pdf (commenting that ―the industry now spends far more 
on research and development (R&D) and produces far fewer new molecules than it did 20 years 
ago‖); David Malakoff, Spiraling Costs Threaten Gridlock, 322 SCIENCE 210, 210 (2008) 
(describing how drug testing costs have ―skyrocketed to nearly $400 million on average, even 
as the number of major new treatments emerging from the pipeline has fallen‖).  
 17. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Breakthrough of the Year: Human Genetic Variation, 318 
SCIENCE 1842, 1842 (2007) (reporting that Science chose ―human genetic variation‖ as the 
scientific breakthrough of the year and that the studies completed during 2007 ―drove home 
how complex the genome is‖). 
 18. GARY P. PISANO, SCIENCE BUSINESS: THE PROMISE, THE REALITY, AND THE FUTURE 
OF BIOTECH 64–68 (2006). 
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obstacles to effective regulation. The dearth of information and 
modest controls over the thousands of industrial chemicals sold in the 
United States are a recurring source of tension in the federal 
government and an outrage for many stakeholders. Yet, the 
information that science can provide is costly, time-consuming to 
obtain, and often of modest value given its large uncertainties.
19
 
These shortcomings invite industry opposition to regulatory testing 
and have had particular salience for the vast majority of chemicals 
that are produced in low quantities. The promise of resolving 
scientific uncertainties is therefore central to the hope that 
toxicogenomics will transform toxicology and the belief that science 
warrants large investments of time and resources. 
I will argue that policymakers and stakeholders should be leery of 
claims, whether regulatory or scientific, that the tensions in toxics 
regulation can be resolved. For the foreseeable future, the problems 
are too complex and our understanding too modest for difficult 
choices to be avoided. This recognition does not imply that toxics 
regulation in the United States cannot be improved, such as by 
adopting certain elements of REACH, or that investments in 
toxicological science are futile. Rather, it suggests that toxics 
regulation, particularly in the near-term, must take into account the 
prevailing constraints. It should not be premised on transcending 
knowledge gaps, but instead on empowering agencies, in conjunction 
with stakeholders, to manage effectively the unavoidable 
uncertainties. 
One straightforward implication of this approach is that toxics 
regulation should avoid the deep epistemic gaps to the extent that it 
can. New and existing regulatory regimes reflect this 
commonsensical approach by adopting proxies for chemical risk 
potential, such as the quantity of a chemical sold annually, its 
environmental persistence, and its potential to bioaccumulate.
20
 Other 
 
 19. See Thomas Hartung, Toxicology for the Twenty-First Century, 460 NATURE 208, 208 
(2009) (stating that worldwide about two billion euros are spent annually on toxicological 
testing). 
 20. See infra Part I.A–B. This kind of tiered strategy predates the passage of TSCA; it 
informed the basic structure of the legislation. See, e.g., NAT‘L ACAD. OF SCI., COMM. ON 
PRINCIPLES OF DECISION MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENV‘T, DECISION 
MAKING FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT app. J, at 224–27 (1975). 
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opportunities also exist to mitigate the informational burdens of 
toxics regulation, but they are more controversial and entail complex 
tradeoffs. For example, some laws permit use of toxicity testing data 
for structurally related or analogous compounds to alleviate testing 
burdens, but this strategy is often criticized for being scientifically 
unsound.
21
 Relying more on post-marketing monitoring, as opposed 
to pre-manufacturing testing, can also mitigate the costs of regulatory 
delays and of testing itself. However, this necessarily trades off the 
possibility of preventing harm ex ante for the prospect of an 
enhanced likelihood of detecting risks after a chemical is marketed. 
This Article will draw on the one-hundred year history of drug 
regulation, which represents the most stringent regulatory system for 
chemicals of any kind. An examination of this broader experience 
exposes several commonalities and tradeoffs inherent in chemical 
regulation. It also offers a comparative perspective on the strategies 
used in the regulation of chemicals that suggests an upper limit for 
the stringency of regulation that is politically and scientifically 
viable. Two important insights emerge from this comparative 
analysis: (1) the ex ante-ex post dichotomy that is often drawn 
between common law and statutory law is overstated—if not simply 
false—for chemical regulation, and (2) for most chemicals tiered 
―precautionary‖ systems like those embodied in REACH represent 
more of a change in rhetoric than a fundamental shift in substance 
over the status quo. 
Complementing the comparative historical analysis, this Article 
will provide an overview of recent scientific developments and their 
implications for toxics regulation. I expect the direct impacts to be 
marginal, at least for the foreseeable future. More importantly, given 
the limited resources available to toxics programs and the steep 
opportunity costs that these financial constraints impose, I will 
advocate that the Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖) and 
National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences (―NIEHS‖) 
invest modestly in toxicogenomic research. The emerging complexity 
of human genetics suggests that it would be prudent to allow research 
 
 21. See infra Part I.A–B. 
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to progress in the biomedical sciences before focusing more intensely 
on toxicogenomics.  
The final part of the Article examines promising opportunities to 
improve the regulation of toxic substances, which is the subject of 
renewed interest in Congress and rising support from a broad cross-
section of stakeholders.
22
 It will evaluate three primary policies: the 
virtues of tiered regulatory regimes, the potential role of post-
marketing testing, and the value of complementary innovation-
oriented policies to promote development of ―green chemistry‖ 
processes and compounds. Each will be discussed with an eye toward 
emerging legislative efforts to amend TSCA. 
I. ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING TRENDS IN TOXICS REGULATION 
―The objective [of TSCA] is to keep environmental  
thalidomides out of action.‖23 
The modern era of high-volume chemical manufacturing is a 
relatively recent creation. Chemical production experienced 
remarkable growth during the twentieth century—global quantities of 
manufactured chemicals increased four-hundred fold between 1930 
and 2001, increasing from one million tons to more than 400 million 
tons annually.
24
 In the United States alone, approximately 15.2 
trillion pounds of chemicals are either manufactured or imported each 
year.
25
 On average, manufacturers add over seven-hundred new 
chemicals each year to the more than eighty thousand that are already 
commercialized.
26
 Yet, only 1134 chemicals—less than 1.5 percent of 
 
 22. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Chemical Industry Lends Support to Reform, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 9, 2009, at E4; Aaron Lovell, Competing Groups Agree on Some TSCA Principles but 
Disputes Remain, DEF. ENV‘T ALERT (Inside EPA, Arlington, Va.) Aug. 18, 2009; see also 
Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of 2008, S. 3040, 110th Cong. (2008); Kid-Safe Chemicals Act of 
2008 H.R. 6100, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 23. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1971 and Amendment; Hearing on S.1478 
before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 135 (1971) 
(statement of William H. Rodgers, Jr., Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington). 
 24. Commission White Paper on Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, at 4, COM 
(2001) 88 final (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Strategy]. 
 25. MICHAEL P. WILSON ET AL., CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., GREEN CHEMISTRY IN 
CALIFORNIA: A FRAMEWORK FOR LEADERSHIP IN CHEMICALS POLICY AND INNOVATION 1 n.A 
(2006). 
 26. See CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
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those commercialized—are regulated under five major federal 
statutes, including TSCA.
27
 
Progress in the area of toxics regulation, as the preceding numbers 
suggest, has been notoriously slow, and the track record for TSCA is 
especially troubling.
28
 Over the course of thirty-three years, the EPA 
has issued formal regulations banning or restricting the production or 
use of just five chemicals of the approximately 62,000 that were in 
commerce at the time of TSCA‘s passage.29 Similarly, of the more 
than 45,000 chemicals that the EPA has reviewed since 1979,
30
 the 
vast majority had little or no health or safety data and only about 
3800 chemicals were subject to any kind of regulatory action.
31
 Of 
those actively reviewed, about half (1700) were withdrawn by the 
manufacturer, 1300 were subjected to specific workplace controls 
pursuant to consent orders under TSCA section 5(e), and 570 were 
commercialized on the condition that the manufacturer submit notices 
to the EPA of any significant new uses.
32
  
Limited regulatory oversight has allowed production of health and 
safety information to stagnate. Several studies have exposed the 
dearth of data even for chemicals produced and used in the largest 
volumes. A 1997 report issued by Environmental Defense found that 
basic toxicology screening studies were available for only twenty-
nine percent of the one hundred high-production volume (―HPV‖) 
chemicals in their sample.
33
 A subsequent EPA study of 3000 HPV 
 
 27. WILSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 13. 
 28. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: COMPARISON OF 
U.S. AND RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO PROTECT AGAINST THE 
RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS 2 (2007) [hereinafter RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS] (―Of the over 
82,000 chemicals currently in the TSCA inventory, about 62,000 were already in commerce 
when EPA began reviewing chemicals in 1979.‖).  
 29. Id. at 18; see also U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 10 
(2009). 
 30. RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 8. Approximately 33,000 of the pre-
manufacture notices (―PMNs‖) were subject to review beyond a determination that the chemical 
was exempt (e.g., low-volume chemicals, polymers). See id. at 22 & n.22. 
 31. Id. at 21–22. 
 32. Id. at 22. Under TSCA section 5(a)(2), EPA has issued significant new use rules for 
160 existing chemicals. Id. at 18. 
 33. John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for 
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1382 (2008) [hereinafter Applegate, Bridging the 
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chemicals concluded: ―[N]o basic toxicity information . . . is publicly 
available for 43% of the high volume chemicals manufactured in the 
US and a full set of basic toxicity information is available for only 
7% of these chemicals.‖34 The findings of these studies were 
reinforced by a 1999 EU report, which found that basic toxicology 
data were available for only fourteen percent of HPV chemicals in 
the EU and no data existed for twenty-one percent of them.
35
 
One must be careful, though, not to over-interpret these numbers. 
The volumes of individual chemicals produced are highly skewed—a 
small number of chemicals dominate the quantities sold annually. 
Just three hundred chemicals account for more than ninety-nine 
percent of the tonnage of all chemicals sold annually in the U.S.,
36
 
and fewer than 5500 chemicals are produced in amounts equal to or 
greater than 0.000066 percent of the total quantity sold (i.e., above 
ten thousand pounds per year).
37
 Consistent with these numbers, a 
2005 study found that 159 to 234 chemicals were detected in the 
umbilical cord blood of ten newborns, and a large representative 
study of the U.S. population found 116 chemicals in blood and urine 
samples.
38
 Thus, while the quantities may not appear small in 
absolute terms, the great majority of chemicals in U.S. commerce are 
produced in minuscule quantities in relative terms.  
The aggregate figures also ignore evidence indicating that a small 
subset of chemicals is likely to be toxic. Few compounds that have 
been tested over the past twenty-five years have tested positive for 
toxicity—approximately eighty-seven percent of tested chemicals 
were not found to be acutely toxic, ninety-three percent did not cause 
 
Data Gap]. The study defined ―HPV‖ as any chemical produced in volumes exceeding one 
million pounds annually. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Commission Assessment of Additional Testing Needs under REACH: Effects of 
(Q)SARS, Risk Based Testing and Voluntary Industry Initiatives, at 5 (Sept. 2003) (prepared by 
Finn Pedersen et al.) [hereinafter Add’l Testing Needs Under REACH]. 
 36. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF., HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS: A FINAL REPORT 
CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL CHALLENGE 9 (2007) (describing how 
―HPV chemicals comprise the bulk of industrial chemicals in commerce when measured by 
tonnage‖). 
 37. Id. at 10. Similar production volumes exist in Europe, where about ten thousand 
chemicals are sold in quantities that exceed ten metric tons annually and a further twenty 
thousand are sold in one to ten metric tons. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 4.  
 38. WILSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 27, 31. 
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skin irritation, and about ninety-seven percent did not have 
discernible reproductive effects.
39
 Similarly, under the European 
REACH program scientists estimate that of the pre-1981 chemicals 
produced in quantities equal to or greater than one-hundred metric 
tons annually, about 5500 substances, only about 2.5 percent of the 
total tested will be reproductive toxins.
40
 In aggregate, regulators 
generally believe that no more than twenty percent of the chemicals 
tested will display sufficient toxicity to require regulatory action.
41
 
Two important factors could enhance the tractability of regulating 
industrial chemicals. The first is the continuity of chemicals listed as 
HPVs and production processes generally. Of the many thousands of 
chemicals in commerce, just eight percent (248 in total) of the 2943 
HPV chemicals in U.S. commerce today were introduced after 
1979.
42
 The second is the heterogeneity of chemical characteristics, 
production levels, and uses, which ought to enable use of relatively 
straightforward triage methods and tiered regulatory regimes. The 
Parts that follow analyze existing chemical regulation in the U.S. and 
recent regulatory developments in Europe. Several commonalities 
emerge from this comparative analysis that highlight the incremental 
nature of advances in toxics regulation. 
A. Current TSCA Regime and Pending Legislative Amendments  
Among the most striking features of toxics regulation in the U.S. 
is the degree to which the basic contours of the debate have remained 
the same. The issues that animated debates in 1971 over the 
legislation that ultimately became TSCA are essentially identical to 
the ones that dominate debate today. While there are new potential 
threats, such as endocrine-disrupting chemicals, the central scientific 
and legal issues have evolved very little. Concerns about the large 
uncertainties in toxicology testing, moral and technical objections 
raised against the use of cost-benefit analyses and economic 
discounting, and debate over whether manufacturers or the 
 
 39. Hartung, supra note 19, at 209. 
 40. Id. In absolute terms, of course, this small relative number (i.e., about 138 
compounds) may still be significant. 
 41. See infra Part I.A. 
 42. WILSON ET AL., supra note 25, at 43. 
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government should bear the burden of proof in regulatory decision-
making are as alive today as they were in the 1970s.
43
 
Regulating industrial chemicals has never been easy. It took 
Congress almost five years to pass TSCA.
44
 Driven by widespread 
concerns about the risks from exposures to major chemicals such as 
mercury, vinyl chloride, and asbestos, the Nixon Administration 
elevated toxics regulation to the top of the environmental agenda.
45
 In 
the 1971 annual report of the Council on Environmental Quality, the 
Nixon Administration went so far as to conclude that ―from 60 to 90 
percent of cancer is authoritatively attributed to environmental 
causes.‖46 In its opposition to new regulations, the chemical industry 
claimed that the annual costs of regulation could approach two billion 
dollars, with testing per chemical running upwards of $100,000 and 
taking two to three years.
47
 The government countered that the costs 
would be much lower, as only a small subset of commercial 
chemicals—it estimated twenty percent of the one thousand new 
chemicals introduced annually—would require testing.48  
 
 43. See, e.g., NAT‘L ACAD. OF SCI. supra note 20, at 12–14, 17–22, 39–44, 93–96; Valerie 
J. Brown, REACHing for Chemical Safety, 111 ENV‘T HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A766, A768 
(2003) (arguing that the ―combination of the increased financial burden of testing, the 
bureaucracy of registration and authorization, and the requirement of applying the 
precautionary principle will discourage innovation and could ruin many small and medium-
sized enterprises‖). 
 44. See Gladwin Hill, Congress Plans New Push to Control Toxic Chemical Products, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1975, at 10; Steven Rattner, A Law on Toxics Seems a Certainty, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1976, at 157. 
 45. See John W. Finney, Senate Votes Regulation of Hazardous Chemicals, 77–0, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 31, 1972, at 10 (―The legislation, which was sent to the House, is an outgrowth of 
concern that developed two years ago over the potential hazards of mercury poisoning from 
industrial wastes.‖); Gladwin Hill, U.S. Agency Urges a Drive to Bar Cancer by Screening 
Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1976, at 38. 
 46. Hill, supra note 45. The CEQ report went on to argue that ―‗[s]ome observed cancer 
undoubtedly arises from natural sources like radiation and asbestos, but much of the remainder 
is probably associated with carcinogenic agents produced by man.‘‖ Id.  
 47. Rattner, supra note 44; Harold M. Schmeck Jr., Chemicals Face More Safety Testing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1977, at 99. 
 48. See Schmeck, supra note 47; Rattner, supra note 44, at 157 (indicating that the 
General Accounting Office estimates the cost for chemical testing would be much lower at just 
$100–200 million annually). Initial studies were consistent with the government‘s estimates, 
finding that ten to sixteen percent of the chemicals tested by October of 1977 exhibited 
carcinogenic properties in animals. John Vinocur, Major Enforcement Gaps Hobble Law to 
Control Toxic Substances, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1977, at 1. 
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The central sticking point in 1971 was whether all chemicals 
would be subject to pre-market approval and toxicity testing.
49
 The 
Senate, which supported rigorous pre-market testing, and the House, 
which did not, split on the issue and did not resolve their differences 
until 1976.
50
 Compromise was propelled by, among other events, the 
discovery of polychlorinated biphenyls (―PCBs‖) in the Hudson 
River and in human breast milk.
51
 Yet the Senate and House 
harmonized the competing legislation by opting largely for the 
weaker House bill. Environmental groups played an important role in 
passage of the law by withdrawing their demand for pre-market 
testing of all new chemicals.
52
 The political calculus for supporting 
an inadequate bill was premised on what proved to be a false belief, 
namely, that the 1976 law would be a first step toward more 
comprehensive and rigorous regulation.
53
 
The regulatory deficiencies of TSCA that emerged from this 
compromise have been recounted many times. I will highlight two 
provisions that are relevant to the central thesis of this Article and 
that contrast with those found in REACH and the FDCA. Unlike 
these other statutes, TSCA does not incorporate a regulatory approval 
 
 49. Finney, supra note 45, at 10. 
 50. Hill, supra note 44, at 10. 
 51. New Breed of Pollutants: The Dangers They Carry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 
7, 1977, at 42, 43–44 [hereinafter New Breed of Pollutants]. 
 The major impetus for passage of the law came from PCB‘s [sic]. . . . 
. . . .  
 Traces of [PCBs] are found in nearly all human-tissue samples taken in 
industrialized countries. It is in mothers‘ milk and in the flesh of fish of many fresh-
water lakes and streams. The chemical has shown up in penguin eggs in Antarctica and 
in animals captured in Greenland. 
Id. at 43; see also Richard D. Lyons, House Votes Ban on Output of PCB’s [sic] within 3 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1976, at 61. Other contributing events included the incident of Kepone 
poisoning of workers in July 1975 and the catastrophic explosion involving dioxin in Seveso, 
Italy, in July 1976. Peter Gwynne et al., The Chemicals around Us, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1978, 
at 25, 28. 
 52. Rattner, supra note 44, at 157 (describing how the Sierra Club withdrew support for 
required pre-market testing of all new chemicals). 
 53. See id. (―Supporters of stronger legislation believe that the current bill is better than 
no bill at all. ‗It‘s a start,‘ said Janie Kinney, counsel to the Consumer Protection and Finance 
Subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee: ‗In three years, when this comes up for 
renewal, there‘ll be another chance.‘‖). 
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regime; instead, it requires chemical manufacturers to submit a ―pre-
manufacture notice‖ (―PMN‖) prior to the marketing of a new (i.e., 
post-1976) chemical.
54
  
The notice that a PMN provides is nominal, however, because 
TSCA does not impose any standards for the quality or type of 
information that must be submitted.
55
 This omission is compounded 
by the perfunctory review to which the EPA subjects most PMNs—
relying as it does on largely unvalidated screening models and 
conventions.
56
 Regulatory oversight is cramped further by the ninety-
day limit TSCA places on the EPA review process.
57
 This narrow 
window often is preclusive of regulatory action, which must be based 
on a showing of ―unreasonable risk,‖58 because the burden is on the 
EPA to demonstrate that regulation is warranted.
59
  
The procedural barriers under section 6 of TSCA, which apply to 
new and grandfathered, pre-1976 chemicals, go beyond assessing the 
risk of the chemical in question. In addition to having the burden of 
proving that unreasonable risks exist, the EPA must show that the 
prohibitions, limitations, or requirements it imposes are ―the least 
burdensome‖ available.60 Furthermore, its decisions are subject to 
―searching review‖ by courts under the substantial evidence 
standard.
61
 As a consequence, the EPA imposed regulations on pre-
1976 chemicals only five times over the past thirty-four years, and it 
all but conceded this authority since its attempt to regulate asbestos 
was largely struck down by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in 1991.
62
 TSCA in effect has grandfathered ninety-five percent of 
 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006); see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 99. 
 55. Wirth, supra note 9, at 99. 
 56. CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing EPA‘s use of simple, 
routinized screening models or classification schemes to conduct limited review for all but 
twenty percent of the PMNs that it receives); see also RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 
28, at 13 (―In June 2005, we recommended that EPA develop a strategy for improving and 
validating the models that EPA uses to assess and predict the hazards of chemicals.‖).  
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1). 
 58. EPA interventions require a showing that chemicals ―present an unreasonable risk,‖ 
15 U.S.C. § 2605, as do EPA requests for information about chemicals, 15 U.S.C. § 2604, and 
urgent actions by the EPA (requiring ―imminent and unreasonable risk‖), 15 U.S.C. § 2606. 
 59. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 736–37. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
 61. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 737. 
 62. RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 20. 
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the pre-1976 chemicals,
63
 which account for ninety-nine percent of 
the volume of chemicals in commerce.
64
  
The authority that the EPA possesses to require manufacturers to 
submit environmental- and health-effects data, so-called TSCA test 
rules, is similarly circumscribed by TSCA‘s procedural framework.65 
Typically with little or no data, the EPA is required to make formal 
findings about the potential toxicity, adequacy of other federal laws, 
and alternative options before it can demand that specific testing be 
conducted.
66
 The EPA‘s findings are then subject to vigorous judicial 
review
67
 and to a special hearing process that includes oral testimony 
and cross-examination.
68
  
The procedures surrounding test rules add substantially to the time 
and cost of promulgating them. The cost for a single test rule is 
upwards of $234,000, and the process takes two to ten years.
69
 
Consequently, the EPA has required testing of only about two 
hundred chemicals since 1979,
70
 while it has entered into about three 
hundred testing agreements with manufacturers outside of this formal 
process.
71
 The procedures also have impacted longer-term planning 
for chemical testing. The high-level committee established under 
TSCA to identify chemicals that require testing was moribund for 
years, as the EPA largely ignored its recommendations.
72
 It was not 
 
 63. Wirth, supra note 9, at 102 (noting also that the vast majority of pre-1976 chemicals 
have not undergone even the most basic toxicity testing). 
 64. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 732. 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)–(c); see also Applegate, supra note 2, at 732. 
 66. DENISON, supra note 36, at 6. Specifically, EPA must find that ―(i) [a chemical] ‗may 
present an unreasonable risk‘ or is produced in substantial quantities and may enter the 
environment in substantial quantities or cause significant human exposure, and . . . (iii) testing 
is necessary to provide the needed information.‖ Id. 
 67. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 730.  
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(3)(B). 
 69. RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 28, at 9–10. 
 70. Id. at 9. 
 71. Id. at 8. EPA authority under TSCA section 8 to promulgate rules for recordkeeping 
and submission is also underutilized. EPA has issued only about fifty section 8(d) rules 
covering about one thousand chemicals, which has led to the EPA receiving ―nearly 50,000 
studies covering environmental fate, human health effects, and environmental effects.‖ Id. at 
10–11. 
 72. John D. Walker, The TSCA Interagency Testing Committee, 1977 to 1992: Creation, 
Structure, Functions and Contributions, in ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT (Joseph W. Gorsuch et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993) (describing how, between 1977 and 
1992, the Interagency Test Committee proposed testing of 175 chemicals, whereas EPA 
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until 2007 in the wake of the HPV Chemical Challenge (discussed 
below) that EPA revived its screening and chemical-testing 
prioritization program by establishing the Chemical Assessment and 
Management Program (―ChAMP‖).73 
The obstacles built into TSCA have led regulators to address data 
deficiencies through informal programs.
74
 Recognition of the major 
gaps in data on high-production volume chemicals prompted the 
EPA, with significant spurring by environmental stakeholders, to 
establish the ―HPV Chemical Challenge.‖ This voluntary program 
sought company sponsorship for the testing of, or collection of 
toxicological data on, specific HPV chemicals. The original list of 
HPVs included 2782 compounds, but this number was later reduced 
to 2164 due to exemptions or lack of sponsorship.
75
 
The HPV Chemical Challenge has had mixed success. Among the 
positives, the EPA has received partial to complete toxicological data 
for eighty percent of the sponsored chemicals, with the remaining 
twenty percent having no data as of 2007.
76
 While this represents a 
significant advance over the status quo, these numbers are deceptive 
because much of the new data are based on pre-existing studies or 
surrogate testing (i.e., use of estimation methods or data on 
structurally related analog chemicals)
77—less than ten percent of the 
toxicological data were obtained through new testing.
78
 Among the 
 
required testing for only twenty-five; by contrast, EPA and industry agreed on voluntary testing 
for thirty-four other chemicals). 
 73. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Assessment and 
Management Program: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/CHAMP/pubs/basic.html (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (describing how ChAMP will generate ―screening-level characterizations 
for an estimated 6,750 chemicals produced or imported in quantities of 25,000 pounds or more 
a year‖ and then prioritize them for subsequent toxicity testing or promulgation of control 
measures). 
 74. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 723. 
 75. DENISON, supra note 36, at 11. 
 76. Id. at 12. 
 77. Id. at 4. Also, the EPA has not promulgated test rules for most of the ―orphaned‖ 
chemicals, and as of 2007 it had only issued test rules for sixteen, or six percent, out of 265 
chemicals. Only forty percent of the six hundred newly emerged HPVs have been sponsored. 
Id. at 5. 
 78. Id. at 4; Add’l Testing Needs under REACH, supra note 35, at 15 (describing EPA‘s 
review of 1024 substances in the HPV Chemical Challenge, in which it found that new testing 
was proposed for only two to eight percent of the substances). Either (Q)SAR or read-across 
methods were used to fill thirty-one to forty-six percent of the data points, which is the 
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negatives, the sponsors‘ over-reliance on ―alternatives to new testing‖ 
has been the subject of significant criticism from the EPA and 
environmental stakeholders.
79
  
B. Novel Regulatory Developments Abroad 
The EU‘s REACH program has been hailed as a major departure 
from the status quo of inadequate testing requirements and weak 
regulation of the production and uses of chemicals.
80
 REACH shifts 
the burden to demonstrate the safety of chemicals—regardless of 
whether a chemical is new or pre-existing—from the government to 
manufacturers.
81
 However, to mitigate the burden on industry, 
REACH provides a ten-year transition period during which testing 
will be conducted.
82
 Equally important, REACH establishes three 
primary classes of chemicals with tiered levels of testing 
requirements.
83
 Thus, while manufacturers bear the burden of 
demonstrating safety, testing requirements vary according to 
specified characteristics of a chemical and the manner in which it is 
used. This move to replace a uniform system with a calibrated, tiered 
framework was driven in large part by concerns about negative 
impacts on innovation,
84
 and particularly ―green chemistry.‖ REACH 
 
equivalent of eighty-one to ninety-two percent of the missing data when available test data are 
excluded. Id. 
 79. DENISON, supra note 36, at 4. Further, ―[f]or 83% of the industry submissions that 
Environmental Defense or EPA has reviewed, one or both of us indicated either that more 
testing than proposed was clearly needed . . . or might be needed.‖ Id. at 18. 
 80. Wirth, supra note 9, at 100 (describing REACH establishing ―the most rigorous 
testing requirements of any regulatory regime in the world‖).  
 81. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 741–43. It is important to 
note that more than ninety-nine percent of the substances likely to be regulated by REACH are 
―existing substances‖ that were in commerce prior to 1981. CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, 
supra note 6, at 29. The application of REACH to existing compounds therefore represents a 
dramatic expansion of the scope of EU chemical regulation. 
 82. Brown, supra note 43, at A769 (describing the provisions in REACH that allow up to 
ten years for research and development before a chemical must be registered). 
 83. See id. at A767.  
 84. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 20 (discussing the shift of REACH to a 
targeting testing regime from comprehensive risk assessments, which have been the primary 
cause of delays because ―they require consideration of all dangerous effects, all exposed 
populations and all environmental compartments‖). This focus stems in large part from the 
recognition that the pace of comprehensive chemical testing could not possibly overcome the 
existing backlog of chemicals, let alone keep pace with the introductions of new chemicals. See 
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is also notable for requiring that all toxicity testing data be made 
publicly available.
85
 
Classification based on quantities in commerce and chemical 
characteristics are defining features of REACH. The quantity of a 
chemical manufactured or sold in the EU is the primary metric used 
to classify chemicals and to determine the level of testing required. 
For chemicals sold or manufactured in quantities of one to ten metric 
tons annually, testing should be limited to in vitro testing of acute 
hazards.
86
 The testing requirements are elevated to a standard base set 
of toxicology testing for chemicals sold or manufactured in quantities 
of ten to one hundred metric tons annually.
87
 Rigorous ―substance-
tailored testing for long-term effects‖ is required for quantities that 
exceed one thousand metric tons annually.
88
  
REACH further refines categorization of chemicals based on their 
toxic characteristics; the chemicals of greatest concern trigger the 
highest levels of testing. Chemicals are labeled as being of ―highest 
concern‖ if they exhibit toxicity (i.e., carcinogenic, mutagenic, or 
teratogenic), environmental persistency, bioaccumulative 
characteristics, or endocrine-disrupting capacities.
89
  
 
INST. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., EUR. COMM‘N, REACH AND THE NEED FOR 
INTELLIGENT TESTING STRATEGIES 3 (2005) (concluding that the existing focus on 
comprehensive testing had led to the current situation in which we ―know a lot about a few 
chemicals (< 5%), but we have very little information on . . . most‖); see also Commission 
Strategy, supra note 24, at 5 (―Recent experience has shown that innovation (e.g., in developing 
new and often safer chemicals) has been hindered by the burdens of the present notification 
system. Ecological, economic and social aspects of development have to be taken into account 
in an integrated and balanced manner in order to reach the goal of sustainability.‖). The EU 
Commission goes on to argue that: 
Regulations are a major factor in shaping the innovation behaviour of firms in the 
chemical industry. The Commission proposes to increase the current thresholds for 
notification and testing of new substances, to extend the conditions for derogation for 
research and development and enable test data to be used and submitted in a flexible 
way.  
Id. at 8. 
 85. Commission Regulation 1898/2006, arts. 117–19, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 36–37 (EC), 
available at http://eur-Lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:369:0001: 
0849:EN:PDF; Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 750–51. 
 86. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 12. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 100. 
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Thus, both a chemical‘s quantity in commerce as well as its 
properties determine the level of review. If a chemical is sold in low 
volumes and is relatively benign, simple registration will be 
adequate. As chemicals move along the spectrum toward higher 
volume and more dangerous properties, detailed evaluation and 
ultimately specific government authorization are required to market 
them.
90
 
The EU Commission estimates that most chemicals will not 
require elaborate testing.
91
 It projects that approximately eighty 
percent of the thirty thousand chemicals estimated to be covered by 
REACH will be subject to the lowest level of review under the 
registration program.
92
 About 5000 substances, mostly those 
produced or sold in quantities over one hundred metric tons annually, 
are projected to require full substance-tailored testing.
93
 At the 
highest level, about 1400 substances (five percent of the total) are 
likely to be classified as chemicals of very high concern that require 
formal authorization beyond the basic registration process.
94
 REACH 
also promotes use and development of alternatives to animal testing, 
particularly in vitro testing methods and surrogate chemical structure-
based predictors of toxicity, and thus encourages use of novel testing 
methods.
95
 The aggregate cost for testing under REACH is estimated 
to be approximately €2.1 billion over the eleven-year transition 
period.
96
 
 
 90. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 12; see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 100. 
 91. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 16.  
 92. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 43, at A767 (explaining the eighty-percent estimate is 
based primarily on the fact that the vast majority of chemicals are manufactured and sold in 
relatively low quantities). REACH also exempts chemicals used in either basic scientific 
research or medical applications. Id. at A769. 
 93. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 16. 
 94. Id. ―Some 140 of these substances have been identified as priority substances and are 
subject to comprehensive risk assessment. . . .‖ Id. at 6. 
 95. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 751–52. 
 96. Commission Strategy, supra note 24, at 15 (discussing the potential range for the cost 
of direct testing of €1.2 to 2.4 billion); see also Brown, supra note 43, at A768 (describing 
industry estimates that the direct costs of registration and testing could be closer to $4.2 billion, 
with indirect costs to industry and society of sixteen to eighteen billion dollars from program 
inception to 2020). The cost per chemical is projected to vary considerably, from €12,000 for 
one to ten metric tons per year to €208,000 for greater than ten thousand metric tons per year. 
This amounts to a cost of €404 per metric ton for a substance produced in an amount of three 
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The shift in the burden of proof for demonstrating safety is the 
most direct manifestation of the precautionary principle in the 
REACH program.
97
 This burden shifting is muddied, however, by 
parallel requirements that producers show that the benefits of a toxic 
compound outweigh its costs, as well as that a ―sound scientific 
basis‖ exists for restrictions on chemical sales and usage.98 Equally 
important is the priority REACH places on developing testing 
methods that do not involve animals and replacing existing 
compounds with ―suitable alternative substances or technologies 
where these are economically and technologically viable.‖99 
Canada has adopted a similar regulatory regime under the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999 (―CEPA‖). The 
basic framework is quite similar to that of REACH. The statute 
requires that all ―existing chemicals‖ be evaluated and categorized 
according to the aggregate threat they pose to humans, their 
persistence in the environment or bioaccumulative properties, and 
their toxicity to humans or other species.
100
 Under CEPA, the 
Canadian government has examined approximately 23,000 
previously unassessed chemicals and found that 4300 chemicals 
warranted further assessment or control.
101
 Listing of a chemical is 
significant because it triggers requirements that companies provide 
chemical testing data that could lead to regulation or restrictions.
102
 
The failings of the EPA‘s HPV Chemical Challenge, and TSCA 
generally, are exemplary of the pitfalls that pervade the regulation of 
industrial chemicals where scientific uncertainties are often 
 
metric tons per year, versus €7 per metric ton for a substance produced in an amount of 3000 
metric tons per year. Add’l Testing Needs under REACH, supra note 35, at 29. 
 97. It is important to acknowledge that REACH is not without its critics. Some scientists 
worry that the broad application of existing test methods, many of which they claim have low 
predictive power and high rates of false positives, will lead to valuable chemicals being 
removed from commerce. See, e.g., S. Hoffman & Thomas Hartung, Toward an Evidence-
Based Toxicology, 25 HUMAN EXP. TOXICOLOGY 497, 503 (2006).  
 98. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 746, 760. 
 99. Commission Regulation 1907/2006, art. 1 (33) 2006 O.J. (396) 13 (EC) (listing the 
reduction of testing on vertebrae animals as an impetus for registration system reform). 
Authorization of a substance and imposition of any restrictions require the disclosure and 
assessment of substitute substances. Commission Regulation, 1907/2006, arts. 55, 60(4)–(5). 
 100. See CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 29. 
 101. DENISON, supra note 36, at 30. 
 102. CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 29–30. 
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overwhelming. Similar dangers exist under the newer REACH 
program, which relies on rough categories for triaging chemical 
testing and alternatives to new toxicity testing. These regulatory 
pitfalls anticipate issues that arise in the next part of this Article. The 
same problems, and the gaming that goes along with them, are found 
in related areas of chemical regulation (e.g., testing requirements for 
generic versions of pioneer pharmaceutical drugs).
103
 This is not 
surprising given that chemical regulations as a class share many of 
the same technical and political constraints, and experience in one 
area of chemical regulation invariably informs efforts in others. Part 
II draws on experience in these other areas of chemical regulation. 
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL REGULATION 
The historical record is unequivocal on at least one aspect of 
chemical regulation: high-salience events have prompted significant 
legislative advances since 1902, when Congress passed the first law 
regulating ―biologic drugs.‖ The 1902 law was spurred by the deaths 
associated with contaminated smallpox and diphtheria vaccines.
104
 
Passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act (―PFDA‖) in 1906 was 
prompted by numerous incidents of fraudulent mislabeling of drugs 
and the publication of Upton Sinclair‘s The Jungle.105 Similarly, the 
FDCA was passed in 1938 after more than one hundred people in 
Tennessee were poisoned by the antibiotic ―Elixir Sulfanilamide.‖106 
Perhaps most famously, the 1962 Drug Amendments were propelled 
 
 103. See infra Part II. 
 104. Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics Manufacturing: Questioning the Premise, 
49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 216 (1994) (describing regulation as the ―culmination of incidents 
in 1901 and 1902 in which batches of smallpox vaccine and diphtheria antitoxin were 
contaminated with tetanus-causing microbes‖). Thirteen children died in St. Louis from 
exposure to diphtheria antitoxin that was contaminated with the tetanus bacterium. JAMES 
HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 148 
(1989). 
 105. Aaron J. Ihde, Food Controls under the 1906 Act, in THE EARLY YEARS OF FOOD & 
DRUG CONTROL 40, 40–42 (Glenn Sonnedecker ed., 1982). See YOUNG, supra note 104, at 204, 
281. 
 106. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 
82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761–64 (1996) [hereinafter Merrill, The Architecture of Government 
Regulation of Medical Products] (explaining that a manufacturer recklessly used diethylene 
glycol in an elixir without testing it); see also Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218. 
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by an epidemic of severe birth defects linked to the drug 
thalidomide.
107
 Replicating this pattern, the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act garnered political support following 
revelations about the ecological harm caused by 
dichlorodiphenyltricholoroethane (―DDT‖), and TSCA gained 
legislative momentum from fears about mercury, asbestos, and most 
importantly PCBs.
108
  
The commonality of dramatic triggering events, while by no 
means unique to these statutes,
109
 reflects the strong opposition to and 
limitations of chemical regulation. Passage of the FDCA, for 
example, followed a series of legislative battles spanning twenty-
seven years.
110
 Evidence also exists that the public and policymakers 
lump chemicals together. With the dramatic growth in the production 
and use of chemicals by the 1970s,
111
 the public came to view the rise 
of the new brand of chemicals collectively as a technological 
phenomenon that transcended the regulatory regimes into which they 
have been divided. Passage of TSCA, which occurred concurrently 
with the medical device amendments to the FDCA, was the last major 
legislative effort to regulate chemicals in this line of statutes.  
The shadow of the FDCA loomed over TSCA. Allegations of the 
threats to innovation and delayed access to new technologies were the 
primary tropes of the opposition to both statutes. The incremental, 
multi-decadinal evolution of the FDCA is a testament to their 
 
 107. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1764 & n.35. More modest amendments to the FDCA in 1987, 1988, 1990, and 1992, 
most of which were directed at regulatory streamlining, were motivated by the AIDS crisis that 
emerged in the mid-1980s. Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, 
Present, and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 136–38 (1995). The 1976 
amendments to the FDCA relating to regulation of medical devices were triggered in significant 
part by the fallout from defective intrauterine devices (―IUDs‖) and numerous recalls of 
pacemakers. Susan Bartlett Foote, Coexistence, Conflict, and Cooperation: Public Policies 
Toward Medical Devices, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 501, 502–03 (1986). 
 108. See New Breed of Pollutants, supra note 51, at 42. 
 109. The significance of triggering is common to many pieces of environmental legislation. 
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
59, 67 (1992); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 66–67. 
 110. See generally YOUNG, supra note 104 (chronicling the events between 1879 and 1906 
that led to the passage of the FDCA). 
 111. Richard Lyons, Can Regulators Keep Track of 1,000 New Substances a Year? 
Chemicals in Search of a Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1977, at 108 (observing that the 
production of synthetic chemicals more than doubled between 1967 and 1977).  
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effectiveness.
112
 Industry repeatedly raised the specter of onerous 
regulation causing research to move abroad and delay in access to 
innovative products.
113
 The alleged impact on access to new drugs of 
the 1962 Drug Amendments, which imposed rigorous testing 
requirements, was still a major issue when TSCA was passed.
114
 This 
concern was reinforced by fears about declining innovative output in 
the U.S. during the 1970s.
115
 
The politics and science of toxics regulation contain formidable 
barriers to legislative reform of the TSCA. Two important themes run 
throughout the history of chemical regulation. The first is that 
obtaining adequate information is a costly part of the regulatory 
process, both in terms of time and dollars. The FDCA is the poster 
child in this respect, as the costs of clinical drug testing run upwards 
of $600 million and involve years of work.
116
 The second is that the 
uncertainties in assessing chemical toxicity make it exceedingly 
difficult to calibrate agency discretion, which tends toward a 
dichotomous all-or-nothing standard of judicial review. In particular, 
the courts have given the FDA broad discretion
117
 while they subject 
the EPA to close scrutiny.
118
 These core constraints suggest that 
toxics regulation may evolve, but without fundamental changes in the 
politics or science, dramatic reform is unlikely. 
This Part provides a historical perspective on the regulation of 
chemicals and medical technologies more broadly. The characteristic 
that binds these areas of regulation together is the persistent 
 
 112. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1756–57 (―The reformers believe that the need for advance FDA approval-not only to 
market new products, but to conduct, continue, or expand clinical trials, to build and operate 
new plants, to modify already approved products, to change labeling, to export—is the primary 
governmental obstacle to innovation.‖). 
 113. John T. Kelly, Three Years Later, 21 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 21, 25 (1966). 
 114. Toxic Substances Control Act, Hearings on H.R. 5276 and H.R. 10840 before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance, 92nd Cong. 131–32 (1972); Kelly, supra note 113, at 26 
(describing how average review times increased from less than three months pre-1962 to about 
eighteen months after the 1962 Amendments).  
 115. See NAT‘L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 18, 21 (2004); 
Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, The Determinants of Pharmaceutical Research and 
Development Expenditures, 10 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 201, 201–02 (2000). 
 116. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is 
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 475–76 (2007). 
 117. H. Thomas Austern, Expertise in Vivo, 15 ADMIN. L. REV. 46, 49–51 (1963). 
 118. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 736–38. 
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uncertainty in the risks associated with technologies that impact 
human health. The review that follows focuses on two issues: (1) the 
importance of allocating who has the burden of proof, and (2) the 
variation in testing requirements that is permitted based on either 
different classes of technologies or allowances for some form of 
surrogate testing. As demonstrated below, the two issues interact in 
important ways, such that the latter can limit or even undermine the 
significance of the former. Above all, this historical overview reveals 
that chemical regulations are converging to a loosely calibrated 
multi-tiered system that is emerging as the de facto model for 
chemical regulation going forward. 
A. Anticipatory Developments in Drug Regulation 
Regulation of chemicals, as exemplified by the FDCA, could 
easily, though mistakenly, be portrayed as a movement from weak 
information-oriented requirements to strict standards that must be met 
before a product can be marketed. This progressive narrative 
overlooks the Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of 1902 (―1902 Act‖), the 
first federal statute to impose stringent pre-market approval 
requirements on chemicals of any kind.
119
 The 1902 Act, which later 
was amended as the Public Health Service Act (―PHSA‖), regulates 
biologic drugs, such as vaccines,
120
 and to this day represents a high-
water mark in chemical regulation. The PHSA is also notable in that 
it began by regulating manufacturing processes, as opposed to end 
products per se, because testing methods for biologic drugs were 
virtually nonexistent at the time.
121
 
 
 119. Virus, Serum, and Toxin Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006). The PHSA defines ―biologic product‖ as ―virus, therapeutic 
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or 
analogous product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition 
of human beings.‖ Id. § 262(i). Less formally, biologics are typically defined as ―complex 
molecules or mixtures of biological origin, but do not include antibiotics or hormones.‖ 
Gamerman, supra note 104, at 215. 
 121. See Gamerman, supra note 104, at 216–17 (describing how regulation of the final 
product could not ensure safety, as minor variations in the manufacturing process could have 
severe and unpredictable results, in particular the high risk of contamination because biologics 
were typical crude extracts from human or other animal tissues).  
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The stars aligned for the PHSA, which was supported by federal 
agencies, the drug industry, and the medical community. 
Government-based public health departments initially developed and 
produced the biologic drug for treating diphtheria,
122
 the blockbuster 
drug of its era, which gave federal officials exceptional authority in 
the eyes of congressional members. At the same time, the drug 
industry and medical community were in their formative years and 
saw the PHSA as protecting their interests.
123
 The few established 
companies viewed the law as a means of limiting competition and 
promoting consumer confidence, which was threatened by 
unscrupulous producers.
124
 In a similar vein, the medical community 
viewed the legislation as important to strengthening the still-tenuous 
credibility of medicine as a science.
125
 
These unique circumstances led to rapid legislative action by 
Congress. After the Health Commissioners of the District of 
Columbia drafted the bill, with support from the District of Columbia 
Medical Society and the Hygienic Laboratory of the federal Public 
Health Service, the PHSA passed with essentially no congressional 
debate and no public involvement.
126
  
The PHSA is a prototypical licensing statute. Under the statute, 
―[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce any biological product unless . . . a biologics license is in 
effect for the biological product.‖127 To market a biologic, a 
manufacturer is also required to obtain a license.
128
 Biologics must be 
produced at properly licensed establishments, which are subject to 
―annual licensing renewal, unannounced inspections, [and 
 
 122. JONATHAN LIEBENAU, MEDICAL SCIENCE AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY: THE FORMATION 
OF THE AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 51, 54–55 (1987) (describing how public 
health departments in cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington were 
instrumental in producing biologic drugs, most notably the antitoxin for diphtheria). 
 123. See David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues 
Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based 
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 149 (2005).  
 124. YOUNG, supra note 104, at 148–49. 
 125. See id. at 148 (describing how the drug industry and doctors were frustrated by 
opposing groups, such as ―anti-vaccinationists,‖ who challenged the precepts of medicine 
during this period). 
 126. See id. 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1) (2006). 
 128. Id. § 262(a)(2)(A). 
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requirements] that product samples be examined by the government 
laboratory for purity and potency.‖129 Beginning in 1944, biologic 
products themselves were required to ―meet standards, designed to 
ensure the continued safety, purity, and potency.‖130 Throughout the 
process, the drug producer bears the burden of demonstrating the 
safety of its manufacturing processes, as well as the safety and 
efficacy of the product itself.
131
 
For many decades the stringency of the PHSA licensing 
requirements were unique, a fact reflected by the modest scope of the 
Act‘s amendments. Other than the 1944 amendments mentioned 
above, the only significant change to the law involved the transfer of 
concurrent regulatory authority to the FDA and National Institutes of 
Health in 1972.
132
 Later, maintenance of a distinct regulatory regime 
for biologics came under significant fire with the advent of modern 
biotechnology, which nullified the distinctions between traditional 
drugs and biologics, and the regulatory failures associated with 
contaminated blood during the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1980s.
133
 But 
the statute withstood the political pressures brought on by these 
events and remains largely intact.
134
  
Despite following closely on the heels of the PHSA, the politics 
and substance of the FDCA could not have been more different. 
While the PHSA garnered no public attention, passage of the FDCA 
was the culmination of hotly contested efforts to regulate food and 
drugs that dated back to 1879.
135
 The limited scope and lengthy 
 
 129. Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A). In addition, Phase 
III testing of biologics generally must be in a commercial-scale facility, and only the 
manufacturer of a biologic that meets this requirement can have marketing rights. Gamerman, 
supra note 104, at 214. 
 130. Ch. 373, § 351, 58 Stat. 702 (1944) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I)). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. 262(a)(2)(C) (explaining that a biologics license shall be approved upon 
demonstration that the biologic product ―is safe, pure, and potent; and the facility in which the 
biologic product is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets standards designed to assure 
that the biological product continues to be safe, pure, and potent‖); see also Korwek, supra note 
107, at 125. 
 132. Edward L. Korwek & Michael N. Druckman, Human Biologics, in FOOD AND DRUG 
L. AND REG. 433, 437 (2008). 
 133. Gamerman, supra note 104, at 220–21. The lines were blurred earlier when the FDA 
was given regulatory jurisdiction over insulin in 1941 and antibiotics in 1945. Id. at 219. 
 134. See Korwek & Druckman, supra note 132, at 438–39 (noting that Congress has 
directed FDA to minimize the differences in the review processes under the PHSA and FDCA). 
 135. See YOUNG, supra note 104, at 45. 
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gestational period of the legislation were products of the strong 
opposition to the law. Unlike the strict approval standards of the 
PHSA, the FDCA eschewed formal regulatory review in favor of 
standards designed to preserve the integrity of product marketing and 
branding. The 1906 PFDA gave the government authority only to 
prohibit and penalize the marketing of drugs that were ―adulterated or 
misbranded or poisonous or deleterious.‖136 Claims about the efficacy 
of a drug in treating a condition did not require any scientific support, 
and actual knowledge of adulteration had to be proven.
137
 
The modest scope of the 1906 PFDA was upgraded after more 
than thirty years, following the deaths caused by the solvent-tainted 
antibiotic Elixir Sulfanilamide.
138
 This first set of amendments 
marked the beginning of the FDCA‘s movement toward the PHSA. 
The 1938 amendments established a TSCA-like form of pre-market 
review for all drugs regulated by FDA.
139
 Under this regime, 
manufacturers were required to submit safety data in a new drug 
application (―NDA‖), which became effective unless the FDA 
notified the manufacturer within sixty days that the effective date for 
the application was being postponed to permit further review.
140
 
Manufacturers were entitled to market a drug unless the FDA 
challenged its safety within the 180-day period given to conduct its 
pre-market review.
141
 
The 1938 FDCA amendments anticipated TSCA insofar as they 
distinguished between new and existing drugs. All new drugs were 
subject to pre-market review, whereas manufacturers were given 
broad discretion to determine whether drugs reformulated with 
existing compounds ―enjoyed a sufficient reputation for safety‖ in 
order to avoid FDA pre-market review altogether.
142
 As a half-
 
 136. Federal Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, § 1, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (current version at 21 
U.S.C. § 301 (2006)). Specifically, marketing information could not be ―false or misleading in 
any particular‖ as to the identity of a drug. Federal Food and Drugs Act § 1.  
 137. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1761, 1767, 1790. 
 138. Id. at 1761; see also Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218. 
 139. Gamerman, supra note 104, at 218–19. 
 140. Id. at 218. 
 141. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1764–65. 
 142. Id. at 1762. 
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measure, manufacturers were encouraged to consult informally with 
FDA prior to marketing such products.
143
 
The adoption of a formal pre-market approval process took 
another twenty-four years and the political storm created by a much 
greater human tragedy. In 1962 the severe birth defects associated 
with thalidomide, an anti-morning sickness drug, reached a global 
scale.
144
 This event fueled public pressure for more stringent 
regulation of the rapidly growing pharmaceutical industry.
145
 The 
1962 Drug Amendments to the FDCA established a rigorous pre-
market approval process that placed the burden of proof on drug 
manufacturers to demonstrate, under a substantial evidence 
standard,
146
 the safety and efficacy of their drug products.
147
 Equally 
remarkable, these sweeping reforms were passed unanimously by the 
House and Senate,
148
 despite substantial political opposition prior to 
the shock of the thalidomide debacle. 
The 1962 Drug Amendments delegated unprecedented powers to 
FDA. One prominent commentator has referred to FDA‘s authority as 
akin to ―jaw-bone enforcement‖ that combines drastic sanctions and 
strict criminal liability, both of which are based on vague, highly 
technical standards.
149
 The broad legal framework and complex 
technical questions have led courts to be highly deferential to the 
FDA. In marked contrast to judicial review of EPA decisions under 
TSCA, the FDA has circumvented the formal hearing requirements 
for determinations of whether a pre-1962 drug meets the FDCA‘s 
 
 143. See id. at 1763. The standard for product labeling was also increased to prohibit it 
from being ―false or misleading in any particular‖ and to impose an affirmative duty on 
manufacturers ―to reveal facts material in the light of such representations.‖ Id. at 1762–63 
(emphasis added). 
 144. Id. at 1764 n.35. 
 145. See id. at 1764. 
 146. Id. at 1766. The FDCA defines ―substantial evidence‖ as ―evidence consisting of 
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts 
qualified . . . to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.‖ 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006). It 
also grants FDA very broad authority to determine the design and conduct of clinical trials, 
which FDA has exercised liberally. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, supra note 106, at 1766–67. 
 147. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1765. 
 148. Austern, supra note 117, at 49. 
 149. Id. at 50, 55, 59. 
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efficacy standard.
150
 FDA successfully avoided formal hearings by 
promulgating a high standard for demonstrating efficacy and 
disposing of manufacturer challenges on summary judgment.
151
 This 
and many other decisions have led commentators to conclude that the 
FDA‘s rulemaking process ―has virtual immunity from judicial 
intervention or correction.‖152 
Changes in drug regulation have not been one directional. 
Countervailing pressures have caused Congress to whittle away at the 
absolute bar to the sale of drugs absent formal FDA pre-market 
approval. The pressure to relax standards has come from patient 
groups seeking access to new, promising drugs, as well as the drug 
industry. From the outset critics warned that the FDA drug approval 
process would have negative impacts on innovation and patient 
access to new drugs.
153
 In partial recognition of this tension, the 1962 
Amendments allowed drugs undergoing clinical testing to circumvent 
FDA pre-market approval if such investigational drugs were 
prescribed as part of a valid clinical study.
154
  
It was not until the AIDS crisis, however, that patient groups 
seeking early access to potentially life-saving drugs succeeded in 
liberalizing this narrow exception.
155
 During the late 1980s and early 
 
 150. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1770. 
 151. Id. at 1770–72. FDA used a similar tactic to avoiding having to review follow-on 
drugs that were derivative of pre-1962 pioneer drugs; if the pioneer failed to meet the efficacy 
standard, all of the follow-on drugs were presumed to fail as well. Id. at 1773–74. Similarly, 
FDA was nominally given 180 days to conduct its review, but in practice every new submission 
of data restarted the clock and no manufacturer has had the fortitude to challenge FDA and risk 
receiving a rejection. Id. at 1766. 
 152. Austern, supra note 117, at 54; see also Merrill, The Architecture of Government 
Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 106, at 1782 (―FDA exercises effectively 
unchallengeable authority to dictate the number and kinds of studies required to support 
approval and nearly unreviewable discretion to interpret the results.‖). 
 153. See Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra 
note 106, at 1792–93; Richard A. Merrill, Modernizing the FDA: An Incremental Revolution, 
18 HEALTH AFF. 96, 98 (1999) [hereinafter Merrill, Modernizing the FDA] (observing that by 
the 1990s many critics of the ―drug lag‖ were skeptical of administrative strategies for 
addressing it; they instead believed more fundamental changes were required). 
 154. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1777–79 (explaining that clinical studies are required to secure informed consent from 
participants, keep records, and adhere to FDA clinical testing regulations). 
 155. Korwek, supra note 107, at 136–38; Merrill, The Architecture of Government 
Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 106, at 1836–38 (commenting that the AIDS crisis 
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1990s, Congress passed amendments to the FDCA allowing the 
―treatment use‖ of promising new investigational drugs on a limited 
basis through, in effect, a pre-market notification process.
156
 Under 
this scheme manufacturers were required to give FDA notice of 
proposed treatment uses, and FDA was given thirty days to object to 
them.
157
 Subsequent amendments have instituted ―fast track‖ 
approval processes for drugs that treat life-threatening diseases and 
broadened parallel access to investigational drugs (i.e., to patients not 
involved in a clinical trial) where patient entry into a clinical trial is 
not possible and no other therapeutic alternatives exist.
158
 In essence, 
these amendments created distinct tiers of drugs that can be made 
available to patients on a limited basis through alternative FDA 
approval processes. 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(―FIFRA‖), which governs the sale and marketing of pesticides,159 
and the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA occupy a 
middle ground between the pre-market notice regime of TSCA (and 
the pre-1962 FDCA) and the current pre-market approval process for 
drugs. FIFRA is a licensing statute with a twist. While all pesticides 
must be registered for a specific use, the statutory standard is 
relatively weak—pesticides need only achieve their intended results 
and not cause ―unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.‖160 
This standard allows EPA to register pesticides suspected to be 
carcinogens so long as they achieve their purpose without causing 
―unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.‖161 Thus, whereas 
the focus of the FDCA is on absolute safety and efficacy, the 
 
marked the first time that effective pressure was put on FDA to approve drugs faster). 
 156. Korwek, supra note 107, at 136. 
 157. Id. at 137. 
 158. Id. at 138–39. 
 159. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006). FIFRA defines pesticide as ―any substance or mixture of 
substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, any substance 
or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and any 
nitrogen stabilizer. . . .‖ Id. § 136(u). 
 160. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C)–(D). FIFRA defines ―unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment‖ as ―any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the 
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or a human 
dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent 
with the standard under section 346a of Title 21.‖ Id. § 136(bb). 
 161. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C)–(D).  
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standard for registration of a pesticide is relative and calibrated to its 
benefits.
162
 Further, although the burden of proof nominally lies with 
pesticide producers, for the nineteen thousand older pesticides on the 
market in the mid-seventies, the burden to obtain reliable data on 
their risks effectively lies with EPA.
163
 One of the central lessons 
from FIFRA is that a licensing regime and burden shifting can be 
undermined by lax standards and expansive grandfathering of 
existing compounds. Despite the trappings of formal pre-marketing 
approval, some commentators have argued that FIFRA‘s weak 
regime is reflective of the waning power of environmentalism and the 
growing legislative sophistication of regulatory opponents.
164
 
The Medical Device Amendments were influenced by experience 
with drug regulation and propelled by another regulatory failure: 
eleven maternal deaths from the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.
165
 
In the end, Congress remained firm in its commitment to avoid the 
purported innovation-stifling effects of the FDCA medical device 
approval process.
166
 Consistent with this perspective, the defining 
feature of the Medical Device Amendments is their tiered regulatory 
framework. Anticipating the framework adopted by the EU in 
REACH, Congress believed that it would be inefficient to regulate all 
medical devices, which range from bedpans to cardiac pacemakers, 
under a single regime.
167
 A central premise of the law was therefore 
that ―the great majority of devices would not require premarket 
approval.‖168  
The new law established three categories: Class I contains general 
controls for the simplest devices; Class II contains categorical 
performance standards involving requirements for certain features 
and essential characteristics of devices; and Class III is for the most 
complex devices, and imposes a full-blown regulatory approval 
 
 162. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms 
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 389–90 (1993). 
 163. Id. at 437–38. 
 164. Id. at 434–35. 
 165. William H. Maisel, Safety Issues Involving Medical Devices: Implications of Recent 
Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Malfunctions, 294 JAMA 955, 955 (2005). 
 166. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1800, 1807. 
 167. Id. at 1812. 
 168. Id. 
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process analogous to that for drugs.
169
 Congress‘s decision to allow 
partial privatization of the review process for Class I and II devices is 
a distinctive element of the law.
170
 Begun as a five-year experiment in 
1997,
171
 the program has since been extended and expanded.
172
 
The Medical Device Amendments have had mixed success. FDA 
was mandated to classify medical devices into one of the three 
categories as a first step to regulating them, but the process took 
twelve years to complete.
173
 Likewise, more than a decade passed 
before FDA made significant headway in reviewing and formally 
approving pre-enactment Class III devices—the silicone breast 
implant controversy being the most visible fallout from this delay.
174
 
It also remains unclear whether Congress struck the right balance 
between ensuring adequate regulatory oversight and not unduly 
delaying access to new technologies. A number of recent high-profile 
recalls, particularly of implantable cardiovascular devices such as 
pacemakers and defibrillators, have renewed pressure on FDA to 
strengthen its oversight.
175
 
B. Convergent and Divergent Trends in Chemical Regulation 
The preceding survey of chemical regulation reveals several broad 
trends. First, placing the burden of proof on the producer has largely 
won out. Although relaxed to allow limited access to investigational 
 
 169. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2006).  
 170. See Merrill, Modernizing the FDA, supra note 153, at 106. Under the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, the FDA has authority to accredit organizations to 
perform regulatory reviews, but only for pre-market notification of devices similar to products 
in Class I or II. 21 U.S.C. § 360m. Further, all third-party determinations must be submitted to 
FDA, which has thirty days to accept or reject the action. Id. § 360m(a)(2)(A). 
 171. Merrill, Modernizing the FDA, supra note 153, at 106. 
 172. See Judy Vale, Expanding Expanded Access: How the Food and Drug Administration 
Can Achieve Better Access to Experimental Drugs for Seriously Ill Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143, 
2155 (2008). 
 173. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra note 
106, at 1807–09. 
 174. Id. at 1814. 
 175. See, e.g., Mike Mitka, Medical Device Oversight under Scrutiny, 295 JAMA 1109, 
1009 (2006) (noting the recall of certain defibrillators and pacemakers manufactured by 
Guidant Corporation); Gardiner Harris, Report Criticizes F.D.A. on Device Testing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A17 (quoting the FDA commissioner‘s explanation that ―sometimes it 
takes a crisis before‖ such recognition of the problems with current testing mechanisms occurs). 
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drugs, the FDCA exemplifies this shift and represents the high-water 
mark of chemical regulation in the United States. Second, tiered 
regulatory regimes such as those found in REACH and the Medical 
Device Amendments are emerging as the dominant regulatory 
framework. Third, regulation of industrial chemicals in the U.S. is 
trailing these developments. TSCA, the only statute that relies solely 
on regulatory review, continues to occupy the low-water mark for 
chemical regulation. FIFRA lies somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum with its weak system of regulatory approval. The central 
role of cost-benefit balancing in each of these statutes further sets 
them apart. 
The large scientific uncertainties and high costs of chemical 
regulation have created discord in the legal system. The tensions are 
perhaps most visible in divergent standards for judicial review of 
agency rulemaking—FDA‘s open-ended discretion under the FDCA 
versus EPA‘s cramped rulemaking authority under TSCA. The large 
scientific uncertainties have made it exceedingly difficult for courts 
to adopt an intermediate level of review, forcing them either to defer 
broadly to agency decisions or to use the technical uncertainties as a 
pretext for overturning agency rules. This dichotomous treatment of 
FDA and EPA persists despite the near identity of the sources of 
uncertainty with which each agency contends. 
While this striking difference in judicial scrutiny is troubling, 
calibrating judicial review in this context is clearly difficult. It is 
made more so by the discrepancies in likelihoods and magnitudes of 
risks at stake. Although often overlooked, the difference in relative 
rates of regulatory rejections is an important systemic difference 
between regulating drugs and industrial chemicals. Ninety percent of 
drugs fail clinical trials due to problems with either toxicity or 
efficacy,
176
 whereas conservative estimates based on existing studies 
find that about twenty percent of industrial chemicals exhibit some 
form of toxicity.
177
 
The significance of these divergent base rates is best appreciated 
through representative testing numbers. Drawing on the REACH and 
EPA high-production volume testing programs, we can project that 
 
 176. See PISANO, supra note 18, at 56–57. 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
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about five thousand chemicals will be tested using sophisticated 
animal bioassays.
178
 If past studies are representative, approximately 
twenty percent of the tested chemicals will be human toxins of some 
form, and recent estimates suggest that the false-positive rate for 
animal bioassays is about ten percent.
179
 Although it is much more 
difficult to determine the rate of false negatives, the available 
evidence suggests that the rate is low, as ―[e]very known human 
carcinogen has tested positive in laboratory animals.‖180 I will assume 
conservatively that the false-negative rate is also ten percent. For 
comparison purposes, I will assume that the rates for false negatives 
and false positives in drug testing are both ten percent.  
The difference in base rates—twenty percent versus ninety 
percent—dramatically impacts the actual numbers of false positives 
and negatives. If five thousand industrial chemicals are tested, four 
hundred false positives would be recorded. This translates to twenty-
eight percent of the chemicals testing positive for toxicity when they 
are not in fact toxic.
181
 By contrast, 2.5 percent of the chemicals 
testing negative would exhibit some toxicity.
182
 The corresponding 
numbers for drugs are more divergent and inverted: forty-seven 
percent of drugs that make it through clinical testing should have 
tested positive, while just one percent of the drugs that fail clinical 
testing should have been found safe and effective.
183
 These 
illustrative calculations reveal that false positives are more common 
than false negatives for toxicity testing of industrial chemicals, 
whereas false negatives are of much greater concern in drug testing. 
 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 179. William H. Farland et al., Cancer Bioassays, 5 BRIT. MED. J. E390, E391 (2005). 
 180. Id. 
 181. The math is straightforward: (1) 5000*0.8*0.1 = 400 false negatives, (2) 5000*0.2 = 
1000 true positives, and (3) 400/(400 + 1000) * 100 = 29 percent of compounds that test 
positive are in fact nontoxic. 
 182. The basic math is the same: (1) 5000*0.2*0.1 = 100 false negatives, (2) 5000*0.8 = 
4000 true negatives, and (3) 100/(100 + 4000) * 100 = 2.5 percent of compounds that test 
negative are in fact toxic. 
 183. False negatives: (1) 1000*0.9*0.1 = 90, (2) 1000*0.1 = 100, (3) 90/(90 + 100) * 100 = 
47 percent; false positives: (1) 1000*0.1*0.1 = 10, (2) 1000*0.9 = 900, (3) 10/(10 + 900) * 100 
= 1 percent. I am using, somewhat arbitrarily, one thousand for the number of drugs because 
this is the number of applications that are submitted for new drugs to FDA annually. Schmeck, 
supra note 47, at 99. 
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A naive interpretation of these results would favor the current 
asymmetric approach to judicial review. Courts would be deferential 
to EPA decisions not to regulate and apply greater scrutiny to its 
decisions to regulate, while judicial review of FDA rulemaking 
would be the opposite. But EPA decisions not to regulate typically 
are much harder to challenge because they often involve informal 
decisions outside of administrative rulemaking processes, limited 
data, or neither data nor formal processes.
184
 EPA decisions to 
regulate thus are already much more likely to be challenged.
185
 This 
is not the case for the FDA, which is required to affirmatively make a 
decision regarding every drug it reviews, so that judicial review of its 
decisions is not subject to the same bias.
186
 The complicating 
dynamic for FDA rulemaking stems from the broad judicial 
deference courts grant FDA, which discourages legal challenges 
altogether.
187
  
The multidimensional nature of chemical regulation qualifies the 
inferences one can draw from the contrasting base rates between 
drugs and industrial chemicals. For one, decisions are not simply 
whether to regulate—the stringency of regulation is of equal 
importance. Additionally, absolute numbers matter. The impacts of 
failing to detect the toxicity of four hundred industrial chemicals 
could be severe, particularly if any of them are used in large 
quantities, bioaccumulative, or environmentally persistent (e.g., 
DDT, PCBs).
188
 Multiple factors therefore must be considered in 
structuring a regulatory regime that defies a binary rule. The 
regulatory base rates provide, at best, a rough rationale for the 
different frameworks and standards that have evolved between the 
regulation of industrial chemicals and drugs.  
These complexities help to explain recent efforts to moderate 
chemical regulation at both ends of the spectrum. Under the FDCA, 
 
 184. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 737–39. 
 185. See, e.g., id. at 737. 
 186. See Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra 
note 106, at 1792. 
 187. See supra Part II. 
 188. See Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 725; Environmental 
Protection Agency, Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/ 
epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
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Congress has created limited exceptions to the stringent drug 
approval process, while passage of REACH in Europe strengthens 
regulation of industrial chemicals. This convergence, which affects 
the stringency of regulation and its structure, provides an attractive 
model for renewed efforts to amend TSCA in the U.S. In particular, 
the tiered regimes found in REACH and the Medical Device 
Amendments have the dual advantage of political viability and 
respectable scientific grounding. 
Regulatory error rates also highlight the permeability of 
prospective chemical regulation. This is particularly true of drug 
regulation, where the extraordinary costs of clinical testing and 
substantial rates of false negatives create conditions in which, as a 
practical matter, gaps in regulatory protection are unavoidable. The 
same statistical obstacles affect regulation of industrial chemicals, but 
the bias favors over-regulation. Statistical base rates, particularly in 
drug regulation, qualify the customary distinction made between ex 
post common law actions and ex ante statutes. So long as agencies 
are reliant on traditional modes of toxicity testing, chemical pre-
regulation will have prospective aspirations that it can meet only 
partially, and follow-up monitoring will be an important supplement. 
III. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS CHALLENGING THE 
TOXICOGENOMICS PARADIGM 
―Fast, inexpensive testing methods currently under development 
‗are the potential foundation for a national cancer policy that would 
prevent this menacing disease.‘‖189 
The slow progress of toxicology suggests that science is unlikely 
to come to the aid of regulators in the foreseeable future.
190
 The 
 
 189. Environmental Prevention of Cancer Urged, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Feb. 28, 
1976, at 2. 
 190. INST. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., supra note 84, at 23–24.  
Science currently is the bottleneck for the development and validation of in vitro 
methods for the replacement of complex in vivo toxicological tests . . . However, from 
a scientific point of view it is known that in vitro methods and (Q)SARs (either 
separately or together) will never be able to fully replace the animal tests for the most 
complex endpoints, within the timeframe required by current and proposed legislation. 
Id. 
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standard suite of toxicology tests have changed very little over the 
last half-century.
191
 Use of animal models subjected to high doses of 
a chemical remains the methodology of choice in toxicity testing,
192
 
despite longstanding concerns about their large uncertainties. A 
typical objection is that ―uncertain extrapolations, first from high 
doses to environmental levels that are usually orders-of-magnitude 
lower than those used in the animal studies, and then from animals to 
humans‖193 lead to significant uncertainties. 
A new school of toxicology is importing powerful methods and 
biological insights from the biomedical sciences, especially from 
pharmaceutical research.
194
 These methods focus on changes in gene 
activity levels and the associated concentrations of proteins and 
metabolites in specific cells and tissues.
195
 Potential uses could 
include triaging contaminants and contaminated sites; environmental 
and human health monitoring; regulatory reporting metrics; and risk 
assessment.
196
 High-throughput genomics methods provide a 
platform technology that allows more than 100,000 compounds to be 
screened per day in the pharmaceutical industry.
197
 They hold the 
potential to radically reduce the costs of and increase the rate at 
which industrial chemicals can be evaluated for toxicity.
198
 
Incorporation of toxicogenomic methods represents a paradigm 
shift in the field of toxicology that will require a fundamental change 
 
 191. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 324 (commenting that the basic methods date 
back thirty to sixty years); Hartung, supra note 19, at 208; Michael P. Holsapple et al., The 
―Vision‖ for Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century: Promises and Conundrums, 107 
TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 307, 307 (2009). 
 192. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 324. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 328 (discussing the use of new genomics 
methods in the pharmaceutical sector, including in silico modeling and in vitro screens); David 
J. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental 
Chemicals, 95 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 5, 7 (2007) [hereinafter Dix et al., The ToxCast Program 
for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental Chemicals] (―HTS [high-throughput 
screening] technology optimized for drug discovery is now being refocused to applications in 
toxicological screening.‖). 
 195. David J. Dix et al., A Framework for the Use of Genomics Data at the EPA, 24 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1108, 1108 (2006). 
 196. Id. at 1109. 
 197. Francis S. Collins et al., Transforming Environmental Health Protection, 319 SCIENCE 
906, 906 (2008). 
 198. See id. 
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in the field‘s scope, knowledge base, and methods.199 At the most 
basic level, scientists believe that the rise of toxicogenomics will shift 
the focus of testing from animal models to in vitro testing of changes 
in specific biological processes using isolated cells.
200
 Scientists 
anticipate that this move to in vitro systems will reduce the need for 
inferential judgments to interpret study findings, enhance the 
accuracy of testing methods, and lower testing costs significantly.
201
 
Changes of this magnitude do not come cheaply and will not 
occur overnight. A recent report issued by the National Research 
Council predicted that development of toxicogenomics methods—
and use of them as a basis for regulatory decision-making—would 
take ten to twenty years to implement and require investments of one 
billion dollars.
202
 As I will discuss further below, these estimates are 
probably overly optimistic. If experience in the pharmaceutical sector 
is relevant—and it should be—recent scientific developments suggest 
that progress will be slow. The productivity of drug development, 
which uses the same collection of ―omics‖ methods, is actually 
declining. Further, scientists are discovering new layers of 
complexity that implicate human disease processes and chemical 
toxicity. Cancer, for example, is strongly associated with still-poorly 
understood ―epigenetic‖ processes that govern the regulation of gene 
activity, as are a variety of environmental exposures.
203
 
In this Part, I will review the potential impacts of toxicogenomics 
methods and evaluate critiques that suggest its capacity to inform 
 
 199. See, e.g., Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 329 (arguing that the emergence of 
toxicogenomics ―will require significant revision of the curricula currently used to train 
students for careers in toxicology‖). 
 200. Holsapple et al., supra note 191, at 307 (discussing the shifting ―focus [to] in vitro 
methods that evaluate chemicals‘ effects on biological processes using cells, cell lines, or 
cellular components‖). 
 201. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 906 (stating that use of toxicogenomics will serve to 
―rely increasingly on human as opposed to animal data; and to offer increased efficiency in 
design and costs‖). 
 202. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 328. 
 203. Stella Marie Reamon-Buettner et al., The Next Innovation Cycle in Toxicogenomics: 
Environmental Epigenetics, 659 MUTATION RES. 158, 159–60 (2008) (discussing the ―growing 
body of evidence that environmental exposures, particularly in early development, can induce 
epigenetic changes that may be transmitted in subsequent generations and may serve as a basis 
of diseases developed later in life‖ and noting that many forms of cancer are not linked to 
epigenetic changes). 
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regulatory decision-making will be limited and require decades of 
research. It is here that my skepticism is perhaps greatest but also 
most uncertain given the inherent unpredictability of a rapidly 
changing field like the biomedical sciences. 
A. The Promise of Genomics Methods 
The purported benefits of toxicogenomic methods are remarkable. 
Proponents claim that it will greatly enhance the accuracy of animal 
models,
204
 allow direct measurements of chemical toxicity at very 
low levels of exposure,
205
 permit rapid high-throughput screening of 
compounds for toxicity,
206
 enable multiple chemicals to be tested 
simultaneously for toxicity,
207
 and establish new means for assessing 
harm to organisms beyond humans.
208
 If these predictions are 
realized, dose-response relationships, which currently rely on 
extrapolating from high levels of exposure, could be mapped across 
multiple concentrations that match realistic levels of human 
exposure.
209
 
Gene expression profiling is toxicogenomics‘ foundational 
technology. It tracks the biological effects of a toxic substance by 
monitoring genes that are activated (i.e., transcribed) or deactivated 
 
 204. See Cynthia A. Afshari et al., Application of Complementary DNA Microarray 
Technology to Carcinogen Identification, Toxicology, and Drug Safety Evaluation, 59 CANCER 
RES. 4759, 4760 (1999); Olden et al., supra note 5, at 1966. 
 205. Marilyn J. Aardema & James T. MacGregor, Toxicology and Genetic Toxicology in 
the New Era of ―Toxicogenomics‖: Impact of ―-omics‖ Technologies, 499 MUTATION RES. 13, 
18 (2002); Simmons & Portier, supra note 5, at 904. 
 206. Richard A. Lovett, Toxicologists Brace for Genomics Revolution, 289 SCIENCE 536, 
536 (2000) (asserting that toxicogenomics will reduce the costs and time associated with 
toxicity testing); William D. Pennie et al., The Principles and Practice of Toxicogenomics: 
Applications and Opportunities, 54 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 277, 277 (2000). 
 207. Scott W. Burchiel et al., Analysis of Genetic and Epigenetic Mechanisms of Toxicity: 
Potential Roles of Toxicogenomics and Proteomics in Toxicology, 59 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 193, 
193–94 (2001); Olden et al., supra note 5, at 1966. 
 208. See Michael Waters et al., Systems Toxicology and the Chemical Effects in Biological 
Systems (CEBS) Knowledge Base, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 811, 821 (2003) (asserting that 
toxicogenomics will allow comparative analysis of impacts between different species). 
 209. See Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 326 (describing high-throughput testing 
based on a suite of assays that could reveal dose-response relationships over a very broad range 
of doses); Collins et al., supra note 197, at 906 (claiming that toxicogenomic methods will 
allow testing of compounds ―at as many as 15 concentrations, generally ranging from ~5 μM to 
~100 mM, to generate a concentration-response curve‖). 
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by exposure to a chemical.
210
 Gene expression levels are used as 
signatures of specific toxicity pathways being activated in response to 
chemical exposure.
211
 For example, if a chemical causes direct 
damage to DNA (e.g., polyaromatic hydrocarbons) or interferes with 
hormonal regulators (e.g., endocrine disruptors), a genome-wide 
assay following an exposure would reveal aberrant activity levels 
among those genes vulnerable to the tested chemical.
212
 Scientists 
believe that such gene expression profiling, by virtue of its capacity 
to monitor dynamic biological responses, will enable them to 
understand the underlying mechanisms of chemical toxicity.
213
 
Using known toxic compounds, scientists believe that 
toxicogenomic methods will enable them to identify toxicity 
pathways and how they are affected by toxic substances.
214
 This 
process will allow toxic effects to be catalogued, toxic chemicals to 
be identified by their specific signatures of toxicity, and efficient 
screening of new compounds for potential toxicity.
215
 The major 
challenges to validating these in vitro methods are believed to be 
twofold. First, the observed impacts on toxicity pathways will have to 
be related to actual disease onset and progression.
216
 Put more simply, 
 
 210. Mark R. Fielden & Tim R. Zacharewski, Challenges and Limitations of Gene 
Expression Profiling in Mechanistic and Predictive Toxicology, 60 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 6, 7 
(2001). ―The underlying hypothesis for ToxCast is that toxicological response is driven by 
interactions between chemicals and biomolecular targets. In most cases, these targets are part of 
the cellular proteome (e.g., receptors, ion channels, kinases).‖ Dix et al., The ToxCast Program 
for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental Chemicals, supra note 194, at 6.  
 211. When a gene is activated, its genetic sequence of nucleotides is transcribed (i.e., 
transferred) to a complementary molecule, messenger RNA (―mRNA‖), which is then 
transported to a unit of the cell that uses the mRNA as a template for constructing the protein 
for which the gene codes. Lawrence H. Lash et al., Genetics and Susceptibility to Toxic 
Chemicals: Do You (or Should You) Know Your Genetic Profile?, 305 J. PHARMACOLOGY & 
EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 403, 407 (2003). The number of mRNA generated during the 
transcription process correlates with the level of activity of the gene in question. Id. 
 212. Simmons & Portier, supra note 5, at 904. 
 213. See Michael D. Waters et al., Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing Toxicant-
Related Disease, 544 MUTATION RES. 415, 419 (2003) [hereinafter Waters et al., 
Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing Toxicant-Related Disease]. 
 214. Andersen & Krewksi, supra note 14, at 325 (explaining the process of resolving dose-
response relationships from perturbations of toxicity pathways using in vitro methods and then 
linking them back to in vivo processes). 
 215. See id. (discussing the identification of toxicity pathways (i.e., biological signaling 
pathways) in conjunction with a suite of high-throughput tests to expose ―the range of 
significant perturbations of human biology that might occur as a result of chemical exposure‖). 
 216. Id. at 327 (―Understanding the relationships between early perturbations and more 
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toxicity signatures based on model cellular systems must be shown to 
be predictive of much larger biological harm. The second challenge 
involves relating in vitro test results at specific chemical 
concentrations to the relevant exposure levels in vivo. Metabolic 
processes that break-down chemicals have a dramatic impact on the 
levels of a chemical in vivo, and this introduces a large source of 
uncertainty in determining the levels of exposure to relevant target 
organs or cell types given a specific level of exposure from 
environmental sources.
217
 Continued ignorance about this relationship 
is likely to require that animal testing remain an important tool.
218
 
The EPA is supporting the development of toxicogenomic 
methods under its ToxCast program. In its simplest form, the 
objective of ToxCast is to identify the protein targets and biological 
effects associated with environmental toxins.
219
 In the near-term, the 
program‘s objective is to develop tools that will facilitate the 
prioritization of compounds for standard toxicity testing.
220
 The 
ToxCast program is in the process of using gene expression profiling 
to identify signatures of toxicity for over three hundred well-
characterized toxins (primarily pesticides) across more than four 
hundred end points (e.g., endocrine disruption).
221
 Scientists will 
complement this experimental work by developing elaborate 
computer models for ―in silico‖ testing, with a focus on the liver, 
because it is the target of more than five hundred environmental 
pollutants.
222
 
 
integrated apical responses will require co-ordination of in vitro and in vivo studies in the near 
term.‖). 
 217. Id. at 326 (―Accounting for metabolism in biological systems in vitro remains a 
difficult problem. . . .‖). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental 
Chemicals, supra note 194, at 6. The National Institutes of Health Chemical Genomics Center 
has taken an alternative approach to identifying toxicity pathways via the international HapMap 
Project, which evaluates the differential sensitivity of cell lines. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 
907. ―The ultimate goal [of HapMap] is to establish in vitro ‗signatures‘ of in vivo rodent and 
human toxicity.‖ Id. 
 220. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 907; Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing 
Toxicity Testing of Environmental Chemicals, supra note 194, at 5. 
 221. Collins et al., supra note 197, at 907. 
 222. Id. 
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Scientists acknowledge that major obstacles remain to applying 
toxicogenomic methods in a regulatory setting. The interpretation of 
experimental results is likely to be particularly complex. As one 
expert has explained: ―[n]o single assay or endpoint will have a large 
impact on interpretation of the fingerprint or bioactivity profile. It 
will be the overall pattern across many assays and data types that will 
be the predictor of toxicity used for prioritizing chemicals.‖223 The 
qualitative balancing that integration of a broad assortment of data 
will entail suggests that difficult scientific judgments and discretion 
will not be eliminated by adoption of toxicogenomic methods. The 
judgments no doubt will be different and, one can only hope, less 
subject to uncertainty and disagreement among experts.  
B. Shooting for Mars: Signs of Increasing Genetic Complexity 
―It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the cloning of 
the cystic fibrosis gene. . . . The implications of [the] research are 
profound; there will be large spin offs in basic biology . . . but the 
largest impact will be medical.‖224 
The decoding of the gene for cystic fibrosis in 1989 is a 
cautionary example of the persistent chasm between the promise of 
genomics methods and their medical benefits. Cystic fibrosis was 
supposed to be a relatively tractable case that would demonstrate the 
huge potential of genomics science to revolutionize medicine.
225
 This 
discovery was a watershed event because it involved the first use of 
genomics methods to decode the gene associated with a human 
disease.
226
 Yet, as the scientists who decoded the gene now 
acknowledge, ―[t]he disease has contributed much more to science 
than science has contributed to [treating] the disease.‖227  
 
 223. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental 
Chemicals, supra note 194, at 11. 
 224. P. N. Goodfellow, Steady Steps Lead to the Gene, 341 NATURE 102, 102 (1989). 
 225. See id.; Daniel W. Nebert et al., From Human Genetics and Genomics to 
Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics: Past Lessons, Future Directions, 40 DRUG 
METABOLISM REVIEW 187, 190 (2008); Esther F. Schmid & Dennis A. Smith, Pharmaceutical 
R&D in the Spotlight: Why is There Still Unmet Medical Need?, 12 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 
998, 1000–01 (2007). 
 226. Helen Pearson, One Gene, Twenty Years, 460 NATURE 165, 165 (2009). 
 227. Id.  
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The genetic complexity of cystic fibrosis has consistently 
outpaced scientific understanding. The number of mutations 
associated with cystic fibrosis is stunning—more than 1500 have 
been identified, each requiring a different therapeutic approach.
228
 
Further, despite expenditures of several hundred million dollars, a 
broadly effective treatment has yet to be discovered,
229
 and basic 
questions remain unresolved regarding the mechanism for the disease 
and how specific mutations cause it.
230
 Moreover, while some of the 
impediments may be particular to the cystic fibrosis gene, many are 
not, such as the importance of other associated genes to its 
functionality.
231
  
This experience has led Jack Riordin, one of the co-discoverers of 
the cystic fibrosis gene, to conclude that a central lesson from the 
work on cystic fibrosis is the remarkable complexity of human 
biology.
232
 Riordin has expressed the challenge of applying genomics 
to medicine in the following terms: ―It‘s not like going to the 
Moon—it‘s going to Mars.‖233 
1. The Intricacies of Interpreting Toxicogenomic Indicators 
The intuitive appeal of using gene activity levels to identify 
toxicity pathways has often obscured the underlying complexities.
234
 
Biologists know, for example, that changes in gene expression can be 
caused by a host of processes, such as defensive or adaptive 
responses, that are unrelated to toxicological harm.
235
 Further, 
 
 228. Id. at 167. 
 229. Id. at 165, 167. Two promising drugs, however, are currently in clinical testing that 
appear to mitigate the severity of cystic fibrosis for patients with certain rare mutations. Id. at 
167. 
 230. Id. at 165. 
 231. Id. at 169. 
 232. Id. at 165. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 6; Holsapple et al., supra note 191, at 
307–08 (describing long-debated problems with in vitro toxicogenomic methods: ―(1) the role 
of metabolism, (2) the ability to extrapolate in vitro concentrations to relevant in vivo doses, (3) 
the ability to understand[] organ interactions, (4) the ability to detect epigenetics and other 
unknown mechanisms, and (5) the fact that cell lines have a lot of abnormal biology‖). 
 235. Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 8 (offering DNA repair and breakdown as 
examples of defensive responses and rapid cell growth or atrophy as examples of adaptive 
responses); Jeremy K. Nicholson et al., Metabonomics: A Platform for Studying Drug Toxicity 
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chemical toxins may not directly impact gene expression, as they can 
cause gene mutations that affect protein function without altering 
gene expression levels, or they may not cause genetic mutations at 
all.
236
  
Changes in gene expression levels can be extremely difficult to 
detect. This is particularly true where changes in gene expression 
levels are localized in a small number of cells or where they are 
highly variable, or even random, because of sensitivities to dose, 
timing, and duration of exposure.
237
 External factors, such as seasonal 
variations in sunlight, or internal molecular influences, such as 
hormone levels, can be important and are difficult to anticipate.
238
 
The pain reliever acetaminophen, which causes liver damage through 
random modifications of cellular proteins, illustrates this point.
239
 
Acetaminophen is not associated with consistent changes in gene 
expression levels. Changes vary from exposure to exposure according 
to the nature of the proteins affected. This variability creates a 
chicken-and-egg problem: a central objective of gene expression 
studies is to obtain a mechanistic understanding of a chemical‘s 
toxicity, but it is this mechanistic knowledge that is critical to 
interpreting gene expression data. 
Complex disease processes add to the thicket of gene expression 
patterns upon which toxicogenomic methods are based. Unlike 
 
and Gene Function, 1 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 153, 159 (2002) (―The distinction 
between adaptive and toxic effects remains a challenge with all the ‗omics‘ platforms.‖). 
 236. Gary A. Boorman et al., Toxicogenomics, Drug Discovery, and the Pathologist, 30 
TOXICOLOGIC PATHOLOGY 15, 17 (2002) (noting that many toxins inhibit cellular functioning 
by ―binding to proteins or altering macromolecules, not by directly altering gene expression‖); 
Olden & Guthrie, supra note 13, at 7 (explaining that in many cases, there will be a weak 
association between gene expression and protein levels, and that post-translational 
modifications, independent of gene expression levels, may be essential to the biological activity 
of a protein). 
 237. Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 7–9. For example, alloxan and 
streptozotcin are highly toxic but only affect a certain type of cell in the pancreas that 
constitutes less than two percent of the pancreatic cell population. Id. at 9. See also Collins et 
al., supra note 197, at 907 (acknowledging that in a preliminary study ―[s]ome compounds were 
cytotoxic across all cell types and species, whereas others were more selective‖).  
 238. Boorman et al., supra note 236, at 18; Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 9 
(explaining that it is very difficult to control for externally induced variability, such as that 
caused by nutritional or hydration status, time of last meal, hormonal fluctuations, and seasonal 
and light-induced fluctuations in hormones). 
 239. Fielden & Zacharewski, supra note 210, at 7. 
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simple diseases, the causal connection of any one gene to a complex 
disease is weak and thus difficult to resolve even with powerful high-
throughput methods.
240
 Specific genes associated with complex traits 
may also marginally contribute to toxic susceptibility; therefore, it 
makes little sense to treat them as meaningful predictors of toxicity. 
Further, it may be very difficult to establish connections between 
exposure and harm, because impacts on toxic pathways may be many 
steps removed from sites of damage.
241
 These and other challenges 
have prompted scientists to embrace a highly integrated approach
242
 
that compiles the results of complementary ―omics‖ studies, such as 
proteomics
243
 and metabonomics.
244
 Scientists now believe that this 
kind of holistic approach will be essential to successfully studying the 
mechanisms that underlie toxic responses given the complexities 
outlined above.
245
 
 
 240. Eric S. Lander & Nicholas J. Schork, Genetic Dissection of Complex Traits, 265 
SCIENCE 2037, 2037 (1994) (explaining that the multigenic nature of complex toxin-induced 
diseases means that any single mutation may ―affect the probability of disease, but not fully 
determine the outcome,‖ making toxicogenomic studies much more difficult because a mutation 
―may be present in some unaffected individuals or absent in some affected individuals‖). 
 241. Bette Meek & John Doull, Pragmatic Challenges for the Vision of Toxicity Testing in 
the 21st Century in a Regulatory Context: Another Ames Test? . . . or a New Edition of ―the 
Red Book‖?, 108 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 19, 19 (2009). 
 242. PIERRE BALDI & G. WESLEY HATFIELD, DNA MICROARRAYS AND GENE 
EXPRESSION: FROM EXPERIMENTS TO DATA ANALYSIS AND MODELING ix (2002) (―[A]rray 
data must be integrated with sequence data, with structure and function data, with pathway data, 
with phenotypic and clinical data, and so forth. New biological discoveries will depend strongly 
on our ability to combine and correlate these diverse data sets along multiple dimensions and 
scales.‖); Meek & Doull, supra note 241, at 19–20 (highlighting the importance of 
distinguishing between effects and adverse effects in a scientifically grounded manner). 
 243. Proteomics is the study of proteins in biological systems, particularly their 
functionality and the levels at which they are produced; cells typically contain thousands of 
different proteins. Pennie et al., supra note 206, at 278. 
 244. Metabonomics involves the study of chemical metabolism (i.e., biological breakdown 
of chemicals, including foreign toxins) using methods that allow visualization of tissue-wide 
patterns of chemical metabolites. Waters et al., Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing 
Toxicant-Related Disease, supra note 213, at 418. Importantly, ―[m]etabolic changes are real-
world end points, whereas gene expression changes are not; [gene expression levels] merely 
indicate the potential for an end-point change.‖ Nicholson et al., supra note 235, at 153. 
 245. See Fielden & Zacherewski, supra note 210, at 7–8. It is important to note, however, 
that the process of combining these different sources of information (genomic, proteomic, 
metabolic, etc.) is far from trivial and successful examples of this approach are still relatively 
rare. See Mark Gerstein et al., Integrating Interactomes, 295 SCIENCE 284, 285 (2002). 
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2. Implications of Inter-Individual Variability 
Identifying signatures of toxicity is made more challenging by 
differences in toxic susceptibility between individuals. Studies have 
shown, for example, that metabolic processes involved in neutralizing 
exposures to toxic substances vary by as much as eighty-five to five 
hundred percent across the U.S. population ―with correspondingly 
high variability in cancer risk.‖246 These differences suggest both that 
identifying consistent patterns will be challenging and that the key 
processes may differ substantially between people.
247
 Multiple 
patterns may have to be resolved in order to set regulations that are 
protective of subpopulations.
248
 
Interpersonal variation in toxic susceptibility, although still poorly 
understood, can be attributed to simple genetic disorders, complex 
genetic interactions, developmental differences, epigenetic causes, 
environmental factors, or combinations of all five.
249
 Toxicity 
pathways are also complex assemblages of enzymes (and their 
associated genes) that are designed to compensate for discrete 
mutations and mitigate the impacts of toxic compounds. Yet, 
interpretation of test results and identification of reliable signatures of 
toxicity are undermined by processes that mediate and buffer the 
impacts of toxic exposures. 
The obstacles to validating toxicogenomics methods raise 
substantial questions about their viability. However, over the past few 
years deeper scientific challenges have emerged as the intricacy of 
human genetics has come into focus. Reflecting the significance of 
this deepening complexity, Science selected ―human genetic 
variation‖ as the scientific breakthrough of 2007.250 The editors 
 
 246. Frederica P. Perera & I. Bernard Weinstein, Molecular Epidemiology: Recent 
Advances and Future Directions, 21 CARCINOGENESIS 517, 520 (2000). 
 247. Frederica P. Perera, Molecular Epidemiology: On the Path to Prevention?, 92 J. 
NAT‘L CANCER INST. 602, 608–09 (2000). 
 248. Id.  
 249. See RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: HOW GENETIC 
INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS 58–60 (3d ed. 1999); R. C. 
LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA 27, 43–44 (Harper Collins 1993) 
(1991). 
 250. Pennisi, supra note 17. 
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observed that researchers had started ―appreciat[ing] the extent to 
which our genomes differ from person to person and the implications 
of this variation for deciphering the genetics of complex diseases and 
personal traits.‖251 These observations reinforce growing concerns 
among experts that scientific developments are increasing uncertainty 
in biomedical research and development, not resolving it.
252
 
Scientific developments are forcing scientists to reconsider 
established theories about genes,
253
 to acknowledge that most genetic 
conditions are complex and influenced by environmental factors,
254
 
and to begin to understand a new class of ―epigenetic‖ heritable traits 
that control gene regulation.
255
 To give one example, only about 1.2 
percent of the human genome codes directly for proteins (i.e., 
biologically active compounds), but almost five percent of the 
genome is subject to natural selection, which suggests that so-called 
―non-coding‖ sections of the genome have some functional 
significance to an organism‘s survival.256 These processes are only 
now being factored into biomedical research. 
The emergence of new layers of complexity is already being felt 
in the pharmaceutical industry, which has led the way in the 
 
 251. Id. at 1842. 
 252. PISANO, supra note 18, at 64–68. 
 253. See Mark B. Gerstein et al., What is a Gene, Post-ENCODE? History and Updated 
Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 669, 669 (2007), available at http://genome.cshlp.org/content/ 
17/6/669.fuLL.html#ref-list-1 (―The discrepancy between our previous protein-centric view of 
the gene and one that is revealed by the extensive transcriptional activity of the genome 
prompts us to reconsider now what a gene is.‖). 
 254. David Altshuler et al., Genetic Mapping in Human Disease, 322 SCIENCE 881, 881 
(2008) (―Despite great hopes, [the attempt to find Mendelian traits] proved unsuccessful for 
common forms of human diseases—such as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer—that show 
complex inheritance in the general population.‖); David F. Horrobin, Modern Biomedical 
Research: An Internally Self-Consistent Universe with Little Contact with Medical Reality?, 2 
NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 151, 154 (2003) (describing studies of identical twins that 
suggest environmental factors may account for forty to ninety percent of disease susceptibility). 
 255. Romulo M. Brena et al., Toward a Human Epigenome, 38 NATURE GENETICS 1359, 
1359 (2006) (describing ―epigenetic‖ processes as those involving ―the interplay of DNA 
methylation, histone modifications and expression of noncoding RNAs, in the regulation of 
gene expression patterns from early development to adulthood‖). 
 256. Gerstein et al., supra note 253, at 673. A recent study found that ―a vast amount of 
DNA, not annotated as known genes, is transcribed into RNA . . . . While the majority of the 
genome appears to be transcribed at the level of primary transcripts, only about half of the 
processed (spliced) transcription detected across all the cell lines and conditions mapped is 
currently annotated as genes.‖ Id. 
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development and use of genomics methods. As experience with 
cystic fibrosis vividly shows, even putatively simple genetic 
conditions are proving to have numerous variants.
257
 Metabolic 
proteins important to drug metabolism and implicated in many 
adverse drug reactions display similar intricacies. In one prominent 
case, scientists found that seventy-eight percent of the adverse drug 
reactions tied to the TPMT enzyme were not associated with the 
mutation presumed to be dominant.
258
 Similarly, although more than 
seventy mutations have been identified for a related metabolic 
enzyme (CYP2D6), no genetic test exists for predicting its behavior 
despite the enzyme‘s sixty-fold variance in activity.259 Even the now-
famous BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated with breast cancer, 
upon closer study, are subject to much more genetic variation than 
previously thought.
260
  
Scientists now believe that ―most, if not all, human genes have 
about 3 to 10 major [mutations], and dozens or hundreds, of rare 
[ones].‖261 An important corollary of these findings is that rare, 
detrimental mutations (i.e., a population frequency of less than one 
percent) are likely to be undiscoverable prior to an adverse 
reaction.
262
 In essence, the high degree of human genetic variability 
that exists will circumscribe, if not preclude, clinical uses of genetic 
tests for many complex diseases.
263
 Use of toxicogenomic methods to 
understand and identify broadly applicable signatures of toxicity will 
fail for the same reasons when the underlying genetics are complex—
so-called signatures of toxicity will be poorly representative of the 
population at large or impossible to resolve from the background 
variation. 
 
 257. See Daniel W. Nebert & Elliot S. Vesell, Advances in Pharmacogenomics and 
Individualized Drug Therapy: Exciting Challenges that Lie Ahead, 500 EUROPEAN J. 
PHARMACOLOGY 267, 272 (2004) (―[V]irtually no examples can be cited in which a single 
DNA variant site (genotype) is always associated with a particular trait (phenotype)—in all 
subjects within all human populations.‖). 
 258. Id. at 268. 
 259. Id. (cautioning that this may be overly optimistic but noting that some scientists have 
suggested that ―predictive genotyping for CYP genes will improve clinical efficacy for all drug 
therapy by 15% to 25%, thereby decreasing adverse drug reactions by 10–20%‖). 
 260. See Nebert et al., supra note 225, at 195. 
 261. Nebert & Vesell, supra note 257, at 268. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 272. 
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3. Newly Discovered Layers of Biological Complexity 
Recent developments in the field of epigenetics, which involves 
heritable changes to gene regulation that do not involve DNA 
mutations, exacerbate these problems by further eroding the 
generality of gene expression signatures of toxicity.
264
 Epigenetic 
traits involve modifications to compounds closely associated with 
DNA, such as chemicals associated with its translation or the 
scaffolding on which DNA is organized.
265
 However, ―unlike the 
genome, the epigenome is highly variable between cells and 
fluctuates in time according to conditions even within a single 
cell.‖266 Thus, while epigenetic traits are heritable, they can be 
affected by environment conditions over the course of an organism‘s 
life and can be highly variable from cell to cell.
267
  
Epigenetic processes are likely to be highly relevant to chemical 
toxicity. The role of epigenetic processes in cancer and asthma, both 
of which are associated with environmental toxins, is well 
established.
268
 Epigenetic processes and genetics ―cooperate at all 
stages of cancer development.‖269 Further, a recent high-resolution 
map of a genome segment revealed that only sixty percent of actively 
 
 264. See Peter A. Jones & Stephen B. Baylin, The Epigenomics of Cancer, 128 CELL 683, 
683 (2007). 
 265. Id. (describing how epigenomic ―[g]ene silencing at the level of chromatin . . . is 
particularly important in orchestrating key biological processes, including differentiation, 
imprinting, and silencing of large chromosomal domains such as the X chromosome‖). 
―Epigenetic mechanisms include, among other things, histone modification, positioning of 
histone variants, nucleosome remodelling, DNA methylation, small and non-coding RNAs. . . . 
These mechanisms interact with transcription factors and other DNA-binding proteins to 
regulate gene-expression patterns inherited from cell to cell.‖ Peter A. Jones et al., Moving 
AHEAD with an International Human Epigenome Project, 454 NATURE 711, 711 (2008). 
 266. Miho M. Suzuki & Adrian Bird, DNA Methylation Landscapes: Provocative Insights 
from Epigenomics, 9 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 465, 465 (2008); see also Florian Eckhardt 
et al., DNA Methylation Profiling of Human Chromosomes 6, 20 and 22, 38 NATURE GENETICS 
1378, 1381 (2006) (DNA methylation patterns have been shown to differ significantly between 
different cell types). 
 267. Adrian Bird, Perceptions of Epigenetics, 447 NATURE 396, 396 (2007). 
 268. Nebert et al., supra note 225, at 199; Suzuki & Bird, supra note 266, at 474 (―The role 
of aberrant DNA methylation in cancer has been persuasively argued.‖). 
 269. Jones & Baylin, supra note 264, at 683; see also Editorial, Between Genotype and 
Phenotype, 38 NATURE GENETICS 1355, 1355 (2006) (describing studies showing that certain 
colon cancers in humans correlated with specific patterns of DNA methylation, specifically 
CpG island methylation). 
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translated DNA subsequences coded for proteins, suggesting that 
many regulatory elements for genes are completely uncharacterized, 
and that the inter-gene interactions were far more complicated than 
anticipated.
270
  
The still-emerging complexity of human genetics helps to explain 
the modest success of genomics methods beyond basic scientific 
research,
271
 despite the high levels of funding over the last decade.
272
 
Yet, if successful utilization of genomics methods is proving elusive 
in the pharmaceutical sector, which benefits from far greater 
resources and much stronger public support, it is hard to see how 
toxicogenomics could fare better. In fact, at least one commentator 
has suggested that the validation problems for toxicogenomics could 
be more difficult than those for drug development.
273
  
None of these factors bodes well for rapid advances in 
toxicogenomics or its widespread integration into toxics regulation. 
To the contrary, regulatory uses of toxicogenomic methods appear to 
be receding further into the future and are highly unlikely to be viable 
within the next one or two decades. The magnitude of interpersonal 
variation exposed by recent developments in human genetics is even 
 
 270. Nebert et al., supra note 225, at 202 (explaining how scientists found ―many new 
transcription start-sites, with an arrangement of far more complex regulatory sequences and 
binding of transcription factors than heretofore imagined‖). See also George M. Weinstock, 
ENCODE: More Genomic Empowerment, 17 GENOME RES. 667, 667 (2007), available at 
http://genome.cshlp.org/content/17/6/667.full.  
 271. See, e.g., Holsapple et al., supra note 191, at 308 (acknowledging that high-
throughput ―approaches have already been extensively studied and have arguably not performed 
to their anticipated promise‖); PISANO, supra note 18, at 118–22 (commenting on the ―crisis‖ in 
R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly for new drug therapies, and 
noting that biotech does not have any higher R&D productivity). 
 272. See Pedro Cuatrecasas, Drug Discovery in Jeopardy, 116 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 
2837, 2837 (2006) (noting that the pharmaceutical industry‘s discovery and development 
budget has increased thirty-fold since 1970, and that it spends $30 billion on R&D per year, 
which is greater than the total NIH budget of $28 billion); Billion Dollar Pills, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 27, 2007, at 69, 70 (chronicling the increased spending and decreased production in the 
pharmaceutical industry: ―[I]n most years in the 1990s the industry spent roughly $35 billion-40 
billion on research and development and produced 35–40 new drugs. By 2004 spending had 
swept past $50 billion, but the number of new drugs had fallen below 30. Now annual spending 
exceeds $60 billion, but the number of new drugs has still to grow.‖). 
 273. Dix et al., The ToxCast Program for Prioritizing Toxicity Testing of Environmental 
Chemicals, supra note 194, at 10 (suggesting that the diversity of environmental chemicals and 
issues relating to ―solubility, volatility, or confounding cytotoxicity‖ are greater for 
toxicogenomics than for drug-related application of genomics methods). 
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more sobering. Absent advances in a mechanistic understanding of 
toxicological processes, many subpopulations of individuals with 
heightened chemical sensitivities will lie beyond detection because 
their populations are simply too small. These results have important 
implications for safety factors and efforts to set conservative 
standards as a means of ensuring broad public protection. The risks 
posed by some chemicals could be substantial but unquantifiable for 
a significant number of people.
274
  
It is doubtful that the many complicating problems described 
above can be resolved in the near-term. As a purely practical matter, 
the time and costs required of the research appear to lie far outside 
the reach of environmental toxicology. Thus, despite the great 
excitement that toxicogenomics is generating, and despite its alluring 
potential, the EPA or NIEHS should not expend significant amounts 
of their limited resources on toxicogenomics research and 
development. For the foreseeable future, they would be better off 
investing opportunistically in discrete projects with significant 
potential and otherwise waiting for the biomedical sector to resolve 
the critical questions raised above. Until that time, regulators should 
focus on using the existing suite of tools as openly and efficiently as 
possible. 
IV. LOW-TECH POLICY OPTIONS: MITIGATING ENDEMIC SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTIES 
The preceding Parts highlight the gradual convergence of 
regulatory programs and the halting developments in toxicity testing. 
Toxics regulation operates in a distinctive environment characterized 
by large scientific uncertainties, graduated and escalating testing 
costs, highly skewed production volumes (a small number of high-
volume chemicals dominate the market for commercial chemicals), 
and relatively modest rates of chemical toxicity.
275
 Other areas of 
chemical regulation share these basic characteristics, with the 
important exception of drug regulation, which must contend with 
 
 274. Insofar as current test methods are sensitive to certain types of toxic response, 
population heterogeneity could cause estimates of false-negative rates to be misleadingly low. 
 275. See supra Part I. 
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much higher rates of failure in clinical drug testing. The severity of 
these constraints across different chemical market sectors helps to 
explain the parallels between different areas of chemical regulation.  
The historical record reveals that stringent and weak forms of 
chemical regulation—even of closely related types—have coexisted 
since its emergence in the first decade of the 1900s. Strict pre-market 
approval processes complemented by detailed testing requirements 
were written into the PHSA of 1902,
276
 while the 1906 PFDA was 
limited to weak market-oriented information disclosure 
requirements.
277
 The 1938 FDCA amendments introduced the first 
intermediate level of regulation based on pre-market review, which 
empowered the FDA to intervene prior to commercial sale if it could 
show that a drug posed a substantial risk to the public.
278
 Subsequent 
statutes regulating chemicals incorporate at least one of these 
frameworks.
279
 
The 1970s was a decade of prolific legislative action. Congress 
amended FIFRA twice
280
 and passed TSCA.
281
 But it was also a 
period of growing concern about the negative economic impacts of 
regulation. Passed in the shadow of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the 
Medical Device Amendments clearly reflect congressional concerns 
about the costs of and delays created by stringent regulation.
282
 The 
tiered system of testing incorporated into the Medical Device 
Amendments combines all three forms of regulation—information 
disclosure, pre-market review, and pre-market approval—into a 
single integrated framework.
283
 Subsequent laws have adopted 
variants of this pluralistic regulatory model. The EU‘s REACH 
 
 276. See supra notes 122–31 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 132–34, 138–52 and accompanying text. 
 280. See Act to Amend the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. 
No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (1978); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973.  
 281. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (original version at Ch. 53, § 2601, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976)). 
 282. See Travis P. Meek, Proper Preemption or Contrived Construction?: Why Section 
360K(A) of the FDCA Should Not be Interpreted to Preempt State Common Law Tort Claims, 3 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 231, 250 (2006).  
 283. Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A 
Case Study of the Implications for NanoBiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 602 
(2009). 
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program is the most visible example, but the FDCA contains 
categorical exceptions for certain investigational drugs that also 
mirror a tiered regulatory model. 
A central theme of this Article is that, barring dramatic advances 
in toxicological testing, there is little reason to believe that toxics 
regulation in the United States will advance to a strict pre-market 
approval system. It took almost sixty years for non-biologic drugs to 
be regulated under a formal pre-market approval system, and each 
regulatory advance was precipitated by catastrophic regulatory 
failures involving human casualties. Over the years, industrial 
chemicals have had their fair share of disasters (e.g., Love Canal, 
Bhopal, environmental PCBs), but these often iconic disasters have 
never triggered the political momentum needed to pass prospective 
regulations as stringent as those governing drugs.  
Ironically, TSCA itself may be an impediment to major regulatory 
reform. Insofar as TSCA succeeds in reducing the likelihood that 
catastrophic events will occur, the galvanizing forces needed to 
promote reform may never materialize. In fact, from an industry 
perspective, an optimal level of regulation would minimize the 
likelihood of politically salient catastrophes occurring while allowing 
low-level chronic exposures to persist.
284
 The history of chemical 
regulation in the United States demonstrates that the business sector 
ignores the potential for extreme events at its peril, as they have the 
unique possibility of precipitating major legislative action. 
Despite the absence of a precipitating event, the passage of 
REACH in Europe reinforces my skepticism. The most telling fact is 
that, although public support for stringent environmental regulation is 
much higher in Europe than in the U.S.,
285
 in practice REACH is 
closer to a TSCA pre-marketing notice model than to the FDCA drug 
approval process. While critical for ―chemicals of highest concern,‖ 
the shift in burden of proof under REACH is irrelevant for most 
 
 284. Industry appears, at times, to understand these dynamics. Subsequent to the shock 
created by the thalidomide tragedy, the pharmaceutical industry had committed to supporting 
the 1962 amendments of the FDCA. See RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL VOICE 142–47 (1964). 
But this strategy was largely a preemptive one—the industry recognized that legislative action 
was inevitable. Id. at 143. They supported amendment only to protect against more stringent 
regulation in the future. Id.  
 285. Wirth, supra note 9, at 97–98. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Trends in Toxics Regulation 429 
 
 
chemicals—the limited testing requirements effectively give them the 
benefit of the doubt. Similarly, the availability of alternative testing 
methods, particularly structure-based testing models, has the potential 
to erode testing standards for all chemicals. This flexibility contrasts 
with drug testing under the FDCA, which combines burden shifting 
with stringent testing requirements.
286
 Moreover, experience with 
alternative testing methods under EPA‘s HPV Chemical Challenge 
has demonstrated that the scientific uncertainties endemic to 
toxicology can be readily turned to the advantage of chemical 
producers who are reluctant to test their products rigorously.  
This analysis is not to suggest that REACH is of marginal 
importance. On the contrary, its data disclosure requirements alone 
are significant. Nevertheless, REACH should not be read as a move 
toward a full-blown pre-marketing approval system. REACH is a 
major advance toward something quite different, namely, a pluralistic 
regulatory framework that reflects the heterogeneity of the products it 
covers and the complexities of the scientific knowledge that informs 
regulatory determinations. 
The prevailing political and scientific conditions strongly suggest 
that toxics regulation in the U.S. will not advance beyond a tiered 
framework like that found in REACH. This point is useful insofar as 
it helps to frame the debate over toxics regulations. Policymakers will 
be more effective if they confront the scientific and political 
constraints that bound toxics regulation than if they ignore them. 
Being a negative conclusion, however, it does little to provide much 
positive guidance. The Parts that follow attempt to fill this gap by 
discussing several promising measures, including key elements of 
REACH, that would enhance toxics regulation in the U.S. This 
analysis is of particular importance now because, in the wake of the 
EU‘s passage of REACH, there are signs that Congress seriously 
plans to consider significant amendments to TSCA.
287
 
 
 286. See supra Part II.A. 
 287. See Layton, supra note 22; Lovell, supra note 22. 
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A. Promising Legislative Opportunities 
Notwithstanding the challenging scientific and political 
circumstances, opportunities exist for enhancing toxics regulation in 
the U.S. I will focus on three primary types of policies: (1) tiered 
systems for toxicity testing and regulatory review; (2) enhanced post-
marketing monitoring and independent meta-reviews of toxicological 
studies; and (3) development of parallel policies designed to promote 
innovation (i.e., green chemistry). These proposals range from the 
well-established, tiered regulatory systems, to the more controversial, 
enhanced post-marketing monitoring. Each of them will be analyzed 
below, but the space devoted to them will vary according to the 
details needed to explore them, not because they are particularly 
favored or disfavored. 
1. Tiered Regulatory Frameworks 
TSCA‘s system of pre-market review reflects Congress‘s decision 
to minimize the negative impacts of regulation by defaulting to the 
least common denominator. Under this reasoning, because most 
chemicals are non-toxic and sold in modest quantities, pre-market 
review best reflects the low level of risk typically at stake. This 
regulatory minimalism is compounded by TSCA‘s complete absence 
of testing requirements and the difficulty of demonstrating harm 
under traditional tort actions—both discourage chemical producers 
from conducting toxicity tests.
288
  
A tiered regulatory structure avoids the false dichotomy presented 
by the choice between pre-market review and pre-market approval, 
and it better reflects the heterogeneity of industrial chemicals and 
their markets. In a tiered regulatory structure, much will turn on the 
metrics used to categorize chemicals, as experience with EPA‘s HPV 
Chemical Challenge suggests. Fortunately, several factors are well 
established and defined, including quantities produced or used, direct 
evidence of human exposures (e.g., presence in human blood 
 
 288. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 33, at 1368–69, 1387; Wendy E. 
Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 
774 & n.1, 784–85 (1997). 
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samples), environmental persistence, and potential to bioaccumulate. 
Each of these should to be incorporated into any tiered framework 
contemplated by Congress. 
A central benefit of a tiered regulatory framework is its capacity 
to mitigate the scientific uncertainties endemic in toxics regulation. 
Simple proxies, such as quantities in commerce, cannot be the sole 
basis upon which testing requirements and regulatory standards are 
based, as even relatively small quantities of certain chemicals can 
impact human health or the environment (e.g., persistent organic 
pollutants).
289
 Proxies are most useful in setting the type of testing 
that is required. If testing reveals evidence of toxicity, this result can 
be used to elevate the level of testing and the regulatory procedures to 
which a chemical is subject. REACH uses both strategies to triage 
chemicals that may require formal pre-market approval. 
Agency discretion remains a significant factor in tiered regimes. It 
enters the process in two principal forms: judgments about how to 
classify a chemical and decisions about the adequacy of test methods. 
Insofar as the proxies used to classify chemicals are simple and 
objective, classification decisions will be straightforward. However, 
where ambiguities are significant and the available evidence is 
equivocal, classification decisions can invoke significant controversy 
because they may be determinative of whether a chemical is 
regulated at all. Disputes over the classification of medical devices 
have sometimes been problematic for this reason.
290
  
Assessing alternatives to standard test methods, such as 
mathematical models and the testing of structurally related chemical 
analogues, presents a much more challenging problem. It is also one 
that already has led to significant controversy, most notably under the 
EPA‘s HPV Challenge Program.291 Drug regulation avoids this 
dilemma by imposing a high standard for clinical testing of all 
 
 289. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS: A 
GLOBAL ISSUE, A GLOBAL RESPONSE 1, 7 (2002), http://www.epa.gov/international/toxics/pop. 
pdf; Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH, supra note 2, at 725.  
 290. See, e.g., U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO 
ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT 
PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 6–7 (2009), http://www.gao.gov./new.items/d09190.pdf. 
 291. See Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 33, at 1392–94. 
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drugs.
292
 But this is not a feasible strategy for industrial chemicals 
given their diverse characteristics, generally small markets, and sheer 
numbers. In this context, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars 
per chemical on toxicity testing is a political non-starter. Yet, once 
regulators move beyond rigid standards or conventions, a potential 
morass opens up of often unproven alternatives to direct testing.
293
 
No easy solution exists to this dilemma. A tiered system can 
minimize these uncertainties by categorizing chemicals according to 
straightforward metrics, but this strategy goes only so far before 
complex, technical, value-laden judgments reenter the regulatory 
process. One could use essentially arbitrary conventions or rules 
(e.g., ―alternative testing methods cannot be used in more than thirty 
percent of the chemicals reviewed‖), but this strategy is questionable 
given the large uncertainties in the standard test methods. Reliance on 
rigid rules would risk replacing one form of imperfect, convention-
driven testing for another presumably more costly and time-
consuming form of imperfect testing. The relatively low base rates of 
chemical toxicity provide a further basis for rejecting a blanket limit. 
The epistemic limits on decision-making created by these 
constraints suggest that a procedural, transparency-maximizing 
approach is preferable to a rigid, easily administrable rule. Strict 
substantive standards, almost by definition, are ill-suited to the 
present circumstances in which scientific uncertainties are large and 
the heterogeneity of chemicals broad. Reforms could come in two 
forms given these conditions: (1) applying enhanced procedures to 
EPA decisions to accept alternatives to standard test methods, and (2) 
establishing a requirement that all toxicity data, models, and analysis 
used to support regulatory decisions be publicly available. The first 
of these could be formulated very simply. The enhanced procedures 
would create a presumption against reliance on alternative testing 
methods and would require agency officials to provide a detailed 
justification whenever they accept alternatives to direct testing.  
Proposals to eliminate the secrecy of toxicity testing data date 
back at least to the early 1970s, and they now are an important 
 
 292. See Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, supra 
note 106, 1765.  
 293. See supra Part I. 
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component of the emerging debate over TSCA reform.
294
 The status 
quo already has been upended, though, following passage of REACH 
and its requirement that testing data be made public.
295
 It therefore 
would be a modest, complementary step to require that, as a 
condition for using alternative test methods, any relied upon data, 
models, and analysis be made public. These measures would not, of 
course, prevent overuse of dubious alternatives to standard testing, 
but they would make it substantially harder to use alternatives 
indiscriminately and would empower stakeholders to challenge the 
more egregious misuses of standard testing. 
2. Enhanced Post-Marketing Monitoring and Scientific Meta-
Reviews 
There are technical and practical limits to the level of pre-market 
testing that can be required of chemical producers. As we have seen, 
a tiered regulatory framework mitigates both of these limits by 
calibrating testing requirements using rough proxies of potential risk. 
Post-marketing monitoring and meta-studies are alternative 
mechanisms for mitigating these constraints. Post-marketing studies 
can be less expensive, use different methods (i.e., epidemiological 
studies), and avoid additional regulatory delays. Their downside—
and it is a serious one—is that they cannot preempt human exposures. 
Scientific meta-reviews also operate retrospectively. Their great 
virtue lies in leveraging existing data through transparent processes 
overseen by reputable, independent organizations. In the biomedical 
sector, the Cochrane Collaboration has pioneered meta-reviews of 
studies on medical interventions.
296
 If toxicity data are made available 
to the public, Cochrane-like meta-reviews would offer much needed 
independent analysis. 
 
 294. Layton, supra note 22; Lovell, supra note 22. 
 295. See supra Part I.B. 
 296. COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, INST. OF MED. 
OF THE NAT‘L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
RESEARCH (forthcoming) (prepublication copy at 2–18, on file with author); Mark Starr & Iain 
Chalmers, The Evolution of the Cochrane Collaboration, 1988–2003, (2003), http://www.update 
-software.com/history/clibhist.htm. 
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After many years of being essentially moribund,
297
 post-marketing 
monitoring is receiving belated but significant attention in the 
pharmaceutical and medical device sectors.
298
 The favorable 
economics and the potential to conduct statistically powerful studies 
are driving this movement.
299
 The economics of drug testing are 
particularly stark. Because drug research and development take many 
years and are very costly, time is extremely valuable. Economists 
estimate, for example, that increasing the duration of clinical testing 
of a drug by just one month reduces the net present value of a drug in 
year one by about $2.9 million.
300
 By contrast, post-marketing testing 
avoids regulatory delays altogether,
301
 and its costs can be offset by 
revenues from drug sales, as opposed to consuming capital when it is 
in short supply. This asymmetry makes post-marketing testing 
economically attractive and thus less susceptible to interest group 
opposition. 
The prospect of greater statistical power is equally important. 
Many rare adverse effects of drugs cannot be detected by standard 
clinical testing and could not be cost-justified because the numbers of 
test subjects would have to be very large.
302
 Post-marketing 
 
 297. See Alan M. Garber, Is Having More Preapproval Data the Best Way to Assure Drug 
Safety?, 27 HEALTH AFF. w371, w371 (2008), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/27/5/w371 (―Despite long-standing plans to improve postmarketing surveillance, such 
efforts often take the form of a requirement for more data on safety and effectiveness before a 
drug is approved.‖); Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval 
Process, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 621 (2006) (describing an FDA report finding that ―of 
1191 open post-marketing commitments, only 114 (9.6 percent) had been met, yet none of the 
drugs . . . have been withdrawn from the market‖). 
 298. Garber, supra note 297, at w373 (arguing that ―the optimal information strategy for 
new drugs will likely consist of a shifting balance of pre- and postapproval data collection,‖ as 
post-approval studies do not have the same deterrent effect on small under-capitalized 
companies, and also allow the costs of studies to be offset by revenue from concurrent sales); 
Mitka, supra note 175, at 1109 (describing a recent proposal by FDA to strengthen its post-
marketing monitoring of medical devices); Shelby D. Reed et al., How Changes in Drug-Safety 
Regulations Affect the Way Drug and Biotech Companies Invest in Innovation, 25 HEALTH AFF. 
1309, 1314 (2006) (making the case that ―sizeable increases in spending for postmarketing 
safety evaluations are likely to have a much less detrimental economic impact on 
manufacturers‖). 
 299. Reed et al., supra note 298, at 1310, 1313 (discussing econometric study data on drug 
testing showing that it is likely much more cost-effective to strengthen post-marketing study 
requirements than pre-market clinical testing). 
 300. Id. at 1314. 
 301. Id. at 1315. 
 302. See F.M. Scherer, Uncertainty and Choice: The Challenges of Pharmaceutical 
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monitoring is less subject to these constraints, as drugs with 
substantial markets will have patient numbers sufficient to detect 
relatively rare adverse conditions. Moreover, the ease of conducting 
post-marketing studies is projected to increase substantially with the 
rising use of electronic medical records.
303
 All of these factors auger 
well for the rising importance of post-marketing monitoring of drugs 
and the added information that it alone can provide. 
Similar benefits exist for toxicity testing of industrial chemicals. 
A central criticism of toxics regulation has revolved around its 
negative impacts on innovation, which are driven by the costs of 
toxicity testing and regulatory delays.
304
 Enhanced post-marketing 
monitoring does not contribute to regulatory delays and is less 
capital-intensive than pre-market toxicity testing. However, because 
the costs and duration of chemical toxicity testing would be much 
less than for clinical testing of drugs, these benefits are far less 
pronounced. Further, the expected level of false negatives, estimated 
above to be about 2.5 percent or roughly four hundred compounds in 
total, is significantly lower than that for drugs. The anticipated 
numbers of additional toxic chemicals identified therefore should be 
substantially lower than for drugs. 
The relatively small economic advantages and reduced potential 
for toxic chemicals to be removed from the market suggest that the 
value of post-marketing monitoring will have to be scrutinized 
carefully. Post-marketing monitoring is most likely to be justifiable 
for chemicals produced or used in large quantities or with a 
significant or uncertain potential to bioaccumulate. For these 
chemicals, their heightened significance and the larger numbers of 
potential exposures may be justification alone. On the other side of 
the equation, reducing the costs and increasing the value of 
 
Efficacy, Safety, and Cost, 28 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 267, 279 (2007) (―[T]he adverse 
side effects that have typically attracted public debate are intrinsically small-numbers events, 
with occurrence probabilities too low to yield significant indications of user risk with the 
clinical trial sample sizes customarily required by the FDA.‖). 
 303. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Pharma 2020: Marketing the Future, Which Path Will You 
Take? 7 (2009), http://www.pwc.com/en_GR/gr/surveys/assets/pharma-2020-marketing-future. 
pdf (predicting that ―[b]y 2020, electronic medical records, e-prescribing and remote 
monitoring will . . . [provide] access to extensive outcomes data‖). 
 304. See supra Part I.B. 
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biomonitoring ought to be high priorities for EPA and NIEHS. A 
stronger case for post-marketing monitoring will also exist where 
multiple chemicals can be monitored simultaneously and per-
chemical costs reduced. The Kids-Safe Chemicals Act, pending in 
Congress, adopts an innovative approach to post-marketing 
monitoring under a provision that requires government-based 
biomonitoring (e.g., monitoring of humans for the presence of certain 
classes of commercial chemicals), and this information is then 
available as a potential basis for further regulatory action.
305
 As this 
example suggests, the value of post-marketing monitoring ultimately 
will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; blanket 
endorsement or rejection is not possible. 
Meta-reviews offer an alternative cost-effective means for 
evaluating the risks posed by industrial chemicals. This strategy is 
becoming increasingly important in the biomedical sector.
306
 The 
Cochrane Collaboration, which is exemplary of this movement, is 
dedicated to conducting and updating meta-reviews of medical 
interventions, but it is by no means the only one.
307
 Begun in 1993 as 
an international non-profit organization, the Cochrane Collaboration 
conducts meta-reviews that are published and updated regularly and 
prepared according to strict quality-control standards.
308
 Cochrane 
reviews, which include technical abstracts and summaries for 
laypeople, are made broadly available to the public.
309
 As of January 
2010, the Cochrane database listed more than six thousand reviews of 
medical treatments and diagnostic tests.
310
  
The viability of this independent, collaborative model is obviously 
contingent on toxicity study data becoming publicly available. As 
described above, provisions in REACH will force the public release 
 
 305. S. 3040, §§ 505–506, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6100, §§ 505–506, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
 306. Hoffman & Hartung, supra note 97, at 503–05 (arguing that the most important 
methods used to assess and evaluate the treatment options for a given medical question are 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses). 
 307. COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, supra note 
296, at 2–18. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. The Cochrane Library, Record Counts, http://ww3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/ 
mrwhome/106568753/ProductDescriptions.html#creviews (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
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of a great deal of the privately held toxicity data and should make the 
collaborative approach possible.
311
  
Independent meta-reviews would provide an alternative to 
government reviews, such as those conducted under EPA‘s Integrated 
Risk Information System (―IRIS‖),312 and would augment the 
resources available for this work. EPA reviews are deficient both in 
number and on substantive grounds. The IRIS system repeatedly has 
been criticized for the deficiencies in its peer review processes and its 
failure to involve a representative range of stakeholders.
313
 The IRIS 
database is also far from complete, with many commercial chemicals 
yet to be reviewed and many existing reviews significantly 
outdated.
314
 Moreover, the significant procedural obstacles and 
budgetary constraints experienced by the EPA suggest that significant 
improvements in the IRIS database will be difficult to achieve.
315
 
The establishment of the Cochrane Collaboration was prompted 
by similar circumstances, namely, a critical need for reliable 
information about the safety and efficacy of medical treatments.
316
 
The success of the Cochrane Reviews demonstrates the great value of 
this collaborative, open-science-based approach to conducting 
scientific reviews. Modeled off the Cochrane Collaborative, an 
international non-governmental organization dedicated to conducting 
 
 311. See supra Part I.B. 
 312. Similar to the Cochrane reviews, IRIS studies generate a consensus opinion on the 
potency of toxic chemicals regulated by EPA based on an assessment of the available 
toxicological studies. See Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), http://www.epa.gov/ 
NCEA/iris/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (stating EPA‘s descriptions IRIS); see also MARK R. 
POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 31 (1999). EPA uses 
potencies/reference doses and modeling methods to calculate regulatory standards for each of 
the chemicals it regulates. Id. at 31–32. As such, the IRIS toxicological reviews provide the 
final toxicological information used by EPA to calculate regulatory standards for toxic 
substances. 
 313. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT: EPA HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO STRENGTHEN ITS PROCESS, BUT IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN PLANNING, DATA 
MANAGEMENT, AND TRAINING 13–14 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06595.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO, EPA IMPROVEMENTS]. 
 314. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL ASSESSMENTS: LOW 
PRODUCTIVITY AND NEW INTERAGENCY REVIEW PROCESS LIMIT THE USEFULNESS AND 
CREDIBILITY OF EPA‘S INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM, 3–4, 15–16, 18–21 (2008), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08440.pdf [hereinafter GAO, EPA‘s IRIS]. 
 315. Id. at 55–58. 
 316. Starr & Chalmers, supra note 296. 
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meta-reviews of toxicity studies could take advantage of global 
human resources and avoid the problems with peer review and 
scientific independence that have undermined IRIS.
317
  
Creation of such an independent scientific organization would not 
experience the controversy common in other areas of environmental 
science and policy (e.g., The Nature Conservancy‘s sponsorship of 
ecological science and monitoring).
318
 Scientists, non-governmental 
organizations, and citizens play critical roles in collecting, updating, 
and maintaining data relevant to environmental regulation and 
policy.
319
 Their growing importance is reflected in the willingness of 
federal agencies, particularly the EPA, to work with them and 
provide both technical and financial support.
320
 More recently, federal 
agencies have begun to recognize and utilize non-profit and citizen-
generated data by incorporating this work into official reports.
321
 
Citizen groups and non-profit organizations are now frequently at the 
forefront of efforts to develop innovative technologies and 
programs.
322
 Strong precedent therefore exists for the viability of the 
Cochrane Collaboration approach to enhance the quality and breadth 
of toxicity information on industrial chemicals. 
3. Affirmative Policies to Promote Innovation  
A recurring criticism of toxics regulation is that it threatens 
innovation, particularly environmentally beneficial innovation such 
as new forms of ―green chemistry,‖ by raising the costs of 
 
 317. See, e.g., GAO, EPA IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 313, at 13–14; GAO, EPA‘s IRIS, 
supra note 314, at 26. 
 318. See The Nature Conservancy, Conservation Science, http://www.nature.org/tnc 
science/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
 319. David E. Adelman, The Challenge of Abrupt Climate Change for U.S. Environmental 
Regulation, 58 EMORY L.J. 379, 400–02 (2008). 
 320. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen 
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 223 (2000) (making the point that ―charitable tax 
deductions thus permit the government to leverage its monitoring budget with private 
contributions that exceed the foregone tax revenue‖); EPA‘s Volunteer Monitoring Program, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/monitoring/volunteer/epasvmp.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
 321. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 320, at 219 (describing how organizations receiving 
direct governmental support now monitor ―portions of almost 1000 streams and rivers; 2800 
ponds, lakes, and wetlands; and 4 major estuaries‖). 
 322. Id. at 224 (describing how groups have developed sophisticated monitoring systems 
that rival and sometimes exceed the capabilities of local public enforcement agencies). 
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commercializing new chemicals.
323
 While the increased costs 
associated with chemical regulation cannot be eliminated, they can be 
mitigated or offset by complementary innovation-oriented policies.
324
 
In the context of climate change regulation, compelling evidence 
exists for the effectiveness of parallel regulatory and innovation 
policies.
325
 For example, Denmark experienced unique success in its 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and a critical feature of 
its approach is the use of policies designed to promote technology 
development and adoption.
326
 Recent economic analyses confirm the 
value in combining environmental regulations with complementary 
innovations policies.
327
 
In the context of chemical regulation, precedent for an integrated 
approach also exists. In the pharmaceutical sector, the Orphan Drug 
Act of 1983 (―ODA‖) maintains regulatory objectives while 
providing incentives for innovation.
328
 The term ―orphan drug‖ refers 
to the absence of drugs available for rare diseases
329
 whose small 
markets are insufficient to justify the large costs of drug 
 
 323. See supra Part I.A.  
 324. See David E. Adelman and Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change 
Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 858–60 (2008) (discussing 
ability of states to adopt an advantageous program that couples innovation-related policies with 
climate change regulation).  
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 860; Monica Prasad, On Carbon, Tax and Don’t Spend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2008, at A27 (arguing that facilitating technology shifting is essential to reducing carbon 
emissions). See also Monica Prasad, Taxation as a Regulatory Tool: Lessons from 
Environmental Taxes in Europe, (Feb. 1–3, 2008), http://www.sociology.northwestern.edu/ 
faculty/prasad/Taxation_3_25_08.  
 327. LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INDUCED 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND CLIMATE POLICY iv (2004), http://www.pewclimate.org/doc 
Uploads/ITC_Report_F2.pdf (―To promote ITC and reduce GHG emissions most cost-
effectively, two types of policies are required: policies to reduce emissions and incentives for 
technological innovation.‖).  
 328. Wesley Yin, Market Incentives and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 
1060, 1060–62 (2008). Indeed, the success of the ODA has led other countries such as Japan, 
Australia, and the EU to adopt similar laws. Paul D. Maher & Marlene Haffner, Orphan Drug 
Designation and Pharmacogenomics, 20 BIODRUGS 71, 72 (2006). 
 329. The Act covers ―any disease or condition which . . . affects less [sic] than 200,000 
persons in the United States.‖ 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2006). It provides for a streamlined 
FDA review process with technical support to assist in the development of clinical testing 
regimes. See David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and 
Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 374–76 
(2005).  
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development. Using an eclectic mix of policy instruments, the ODA 
has overcome this market failure. In the decade preceding passage of 
the ODA, thirty-four orphan drugs were produced.
330
 In contrast, over 
the first twenty years following its passage, 229 orphan drugs were 
commercialized.
331
 These developments have led to a substantial 
increase of more than sixty-nine percent in the number of clinical 
trials conducted on drugs for rare diseases.
332
  
The ODA policies range from regulatory streamlining to more 
traditional market-based incentives. By streamlining clinical trials 
and providing technical assistance,
333
 FDA has reduced the time for 
drug approvals by fifty percent. In effect, this streamlining has added 
one to two years to the duration of patent protection for each drug.
334
 
Direct economic support and incentives are also key elements of the 
ODA, including a fifty percent tax credit for the costs of clinical 
trials, which amounts to a rebate of millions of dollars on the large 
up-front costs associated with drug development.
335
  
The ODA has not been free of criticism, and concerns have been 
raised about its susceptibility to gaming and over-inclusiveness. 
Drugs with blockbuster potential (i.e., billions in annual revenues) 
have received orphan drug status when they can be used to treat 
 
 330. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 370; see also Maher & Haffner, supra note 328, at 71 
(noting that fewer than ten orphan drugs were commercialized in the decade prior to the passage 
of the ODA, whereas 269 orphan drugs were commercialized less than twenty-five years after 
its passage).  
 331. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 370. 
 332. Yin, supra note 328, at 1061 (noting scholarship finding that after the ODA, the 
increase in the variety of drugs was higher for rare diseases than for non-rare diseases).  
 333. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND 
REWARDS 71 (1993), http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9336.pdf (observing that orphan drugs 
―may have a very different cost structure from other NCEs, not only because of the tax credit 
but also because they may involve smaller and shorter clinical trials than other drugs‖); Henry 
Grabowski, Increased R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases—Lessons From the Orphan 
Drug Act 16–17 (July 2003), http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Grabowski/Orphan_ 
Drug.pdf (finding that the number of subjects in clinical trials for orphan drugs was much 
smaller than the average for all drugs and that ―the representative orphan drug has R&D costs 
that are significantly lower than non-orphan compounds‖).  
 334. Cf. id. at 71–72 (stating that, for the period 1985–1990, the average approval time for 
drugs classified as ―A‖ by the FDA was 25.7 months for non-orphans and only 18.1 months for 
orphans). 
 335. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 369. The aggregate value of this tax credit is 
significant—through 2007 it cost nearly $2 billion, and it is projected to cost $1.9 billion 
between 2008 and 2012. Yin, supra note 328, at 1062. 
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multiple diseases, one of which is sufficiently rare.
336
 Although 
recent studies suggest that such cases are the exception to the rule,
337
 
these tensions highlight the importance of carefully structuring 
innovation policies to ensure that they stimulate new development as 
opposed to merely providing windfalls for work that would have 
occurred in their absence. 
The examples described above are illustrative of the approaches 
that could be adopted to mitigate the impacts of regulatory costs on 
innovation. Experience with climate change policies and orphan 
drugs shows that when traditional regulations and innovation policies 
work in tandem they can guide innovation in directions with high 
social value. Further, insofar as the technical challenges are more 
tractable—and given the stasis of toxicology, it is hard to see how 
they could not be—focusing limited government and private-sector 
resources on green innovation has the potential to circumvent the 
deep uncertainties that have come to characterize regulation of 
industrial chemicals.  
Experience in other areas also demonstrates that integrating 
regulation and innovation policies cannot be done haphazardly. 
Success is dependent on identifying the barriers both to new 
innovation and to adoption of underutilized existing technologies. 
These obstacles must be evaluated against the gaps left by the 
relevant regulatory framework. Similarly, as the ODA example 
suggests, careful consideration must be given to the scope of the 
incentives provided to avoid windfalls and to ensure that socially 
beneficial innovation is being effectively targeted. Designing policies 
to promote green chemistry, for example, is likely to be more 
difficult than designing policies for orphan drugs, as the attributes of 
―green‖ chemicals and processes are complex and thus not amenable 
to a simple numerical cutoff like that used in the ODA.  
None of these considerations precludes development of parallel 
innovation policies. They instead highlight the care that must be 
 
 336. Loughnot, supra note 329, at 365, 370–71. The multi-billion dollar anemia drug, 
Epogen, is the most glaring example of this occurring. Id. at 370–71. 
 337. Grabowski, supra note 333, at 16 (describing evidence that the average sales peak for 
an orphan drug is about $100 million annually versus an average peak of $500 million annually 
for standard drugs). 
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taken in coordinating traditional regulatory and newer innovation 
policies to capitalize on the valuable synergies that often are 
overlooked.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Cautious pessimism is perhaps an overly negative framing of my 
perspective, and yet I do not feel comfortable resorting to the obvious 
alternative ―realism‖ because it comes across as presumptuous. 
Further, the scientific and regulatory uncertainties implicated by 
toxics regulation leave ample room for a broad range of ―realist‖ 
positions; I am merely on the pessimistic end of this spectrum. 
My primary objectives in this Article are to place toxics regulation 
in the broader historical context of chemical regulation as a general 
class and to make the case that a great deal of work is still needed 
before toxicogenomics will become widely used in toxics regulation. 
The history of chemical regulation in the United States suggests basic 
limits on regulatory regimes for industrial chemicals. I argue that a 
tiered regime similar to that found in REACH is the brand of 
regulation most likely to emerge if TSCA reform were to move 
forward. The obdurate limitations of toxics science reinforce this 
view. 
My pessimism is not nearly as unyielding as the scientific 
uncertainties. The relative weakness of TSCA standards coupled with 
its inertia-filled procedures leave substantial room for effective 
reforms. Tiered systems for regulating industrial chemicals, 
enhancement of post-marketing monitoring, and innovation policies 
directed at promoting new chemicals and processes each holds 
significant promise. REACH very well may be instrumental in 
opening the door to such reforms in the United States. 
I am very pessimistic about two things. The first is that seeking to 
replicate the model of strict pre-marketing approval exemplified by 
drug regulation under the FDCA is untenable from both a political 
and scientific perspective. The second is that investing heavily in 
toxicogenomics research and development with the hope that it will 
rescue toxics regulation from deep scientific uncertainties is 
premature at best and may prove illusory in the long term. 
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